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ISAAC WATTS

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It is somewhat singular that the teachers of Protestant theology who have had probably the widest influence have been not professors of divinity, not preachers, not persons of any standing as theological instructors, but unofficial men and women, often laymen and always self-appointed. For I suppose it is unquestionable that poetry and especially hymns have spread theology more widely than have treatises of divinity. Calvinism was stamped upon English-speaking peoples not so much directly by the *Institutes* as by Milton's *Paradise Lost*; and even more efficient in establishing the system which came to be known as Evangelicalism were the hymns of the eighteenth century; secondarily those of Newton and the Wesleys but primarily those of Isaac Watts. The formative influence of Watts, especially upon the religious life of New England, has been profound.

Hymn-singing is to us so much a matter of course that few persons probably are aware how recent a feature in public worship it is, and how great a strife was involved before it became established. Singing, it is true, formed part of the church service from primitive times; but the hymns of the Oriental and Latin Churches were generally sung by priest and choir, not by the people but for them,

and, throughout the Middle Ages, not in the mother tongue. After the Reformation the necessity was felt for songs in the vernacular in which all the people could join; and Luther's hymns sent the Reformed doctrines flying through Germany, while the Psalms in Clement Marot's version were sung by French courtiers and peasants and fell from the lips of Huguenots as their heads fell at Amboise. In England the same need gave rise to the metrical version of the Psalms by Sternhold and Hopkins, which was adopted by the Church of England in 1562 and continued to be used for nearly two centuries and a half. But, let it be noted, in both the last two cases it was Psalms that were sung, not hymns. The Psalms, it was maintained, were inspired, while hymns were not. This argument would seem to compel the use of the holy text in every particular, without the change of a word and even in the original Hebrew; and there were those who stood up sturdily to the logic of the situation, and stumbled through the difficulties of trying to get a congregation to chant the very words of the Scripture, though not in the original. Chanting, however, had a certain popish flavor; and to avoid both this and unworshipful discord metrical versions were tolerated. In King Edward the Sixth's chapel a metrical version of the Acts of the Apostles was in use, and the royal ear was edified by listening to such inspiring strains as the following:

“ It chaunced in Iconium,
As they oft tymes did use,
Together they into did come
The sinagoge of Jeus.

Where they did preache and only seke
God's grace them to atchieve;
That soe they speke to Jeu and Greke
That many did bileve.”¹

¹ The first mention of the substitution of congregational psalmody for the old choral mode of worship places it in the reign of King Edward VI: “On March 15, 1550, M.

Some, however, took refuge in banishing music altogether; and in the case of the Nonconformists in the latter half of the seventeenth century there was an additional reason for this. Singing might betray to the informer the meeting-house or the wood where the persecuted were assembled. Among those congregations which had no singing was the Baptist church in London whose pastor was Benjamin Keach, and of which half a century ago Mr. Spurgeon was pastor. In 1691 Keach published a book entitled *The Breach Repaired in God's Worship; or Singing of Psalms, Hymns, and Spiritual Songs Proved to be an Holy Ordinance of Jesus Christ*. This led after long discussion to the decision by his congregation to introduce singing; whereupon a disapproving minority seceded and established a place of worship for themselves unpolluted by song.²

Other churches compromised on the Psalms in a metrical version, but, feeling that the line must be drawn somewhere, drew it at hymns. This issue again rent churches asunder. In 1623 George Wither published *Hymnes and Songs of the Church*; and he succeeded in procuring a letter-patent ordering that it should be inserted in every copy of the authorized *Psalm-book in meeter*. But the hymns never became popular, and in 1634 the permission

Vernon, a Frenchman by birth but a learned Protestant and parson of St. Martin's, Ludgate, preached at St. Paul's Cross before the mayor and aldermen, and after sermon done they all sung in common a psalm in metre, as it seems now was frequently done, the custom being brought to us from abroad by the exiles." Nichols's *Progress of Queen Elizabeth*, I, p. 54.

² "A curious controversy once agitated this body [the Baptists], as to the propriety of singing at all in worship; a practice which, at one period, they generally omitted. Mr. Keach was the first who broke the ice; he began to introduce singing at the ordinance; after a struggle of six years it was added to the devotions of thanksgiving days; and after fourteen years more of perseverance and debate it was permitted at the close of each service on the sabbath, that those who chose might withdraw and not have their ears offended by the sound. The church, however, divided, and the inharmonious formed a new society, which still flourishes in Mays Pond. Isaac Marlowe fiercely opposed Mr. Keach, designating the practice as 'error, apostasy, human tradition, pre-limited forms, mischievous error, carnal worship.'" Thomas Milner; *Life, Times, and Correspondence of Rev. Isaac Watts*, p. 360.

was withdrawn. We may perhaps trace some influence of Wither upon Watts; especially between the former's evening hymn, "Behold the sun that seemed but now, Enthronéd overhead," and the latter's "Thee we adore, eternal Name" (II, 55), and between Wither's "Lullaby" and Watts's celebrated "Cradle Hymn." Yet the influence, if it exists, is shown not in imitation but rather in simplicity of subject and feeling.

The aversion to hymn-singing had a certain justification in the strong influence which, as I have said, hymns exert, and the possibility — which unfortunately, as we see, is no mere possibility — that erroneous opinions held by the well-meaning but ignorant authors of the hymns, may be inculcated by them. It was Isaac Watts, who has been called almost the inventor of hymns in our language, who bridged the chasm between the songless or Psalm-using worship and the exuberant hymn-singing of our day.

He was born at Southampton in 1674. His father kept a boarding-school, and was a Nonconformist. This latter fact prevented the boy from going to the university. For though some friends offered to meet the expense of a university education for him, this would have involved his becoming a member of the Church of England; and with the memory of the imprisonment for religion which his father had suffered, while his mother sat with Isaac in her arms on the stone at the prison-door, he refused the offer. Stories are told of his youthful precocity in literature — that he began to read Latin at four years old, and Greek and Hebrew soon after; that he composed respectable devotional verses at seven or eight; that he devoured books, and spent his casual pennies for them. Rev. Samuel Price, his colleague in the pastorate, gives the following account of the beginning of his hymn-writing, before he was fifteen years old:

"The hymns which were sung at the Dissenting Meeting at Southampton were so little to the gust of Mr. Watts that he could not for-

bear complaining of them to his father. The father bid him try what he could do to mend the matter. He did; and had such success in his first essay, 'Behold the glories of the Lamb,' that a second hymn was earnestly desired of him, and then a third and fourth, till in process of time there was such a number of them as to make up a volume."³

This is an instance of the excellence and the defect of Watts as a hymn-writer. Apart from the fact that it is remarkable that a hymn like this could have been written by so young a person, the hymn shows Watts's directness of statement, ease of expression, and vividness in depicting a scene; but its origin was the demand of an external occasion rather than the compulsion of an internal impulse. Much of his poetry is of this stamp, and therefore tends to being machine-made. It would have been well if he had taken the advice of his friend Sir Edward King, who said to him in early life, "Young man, I hear that you make verses. Let me advise you never to do it but when you cannot help it."

When he was fifteen he was sent to an academy in London, whose principal, Rev. Thomas Rowe, was also minister of a congregation of Independents. On leaving the academy he entered on one of those periods of mental incubation in which poets — Milton, Tennyson, and many others — have often engaged. He spent two years and a half in his father's house, doing nothing, so far as accomplishment was visible, but, like another Congregational poet — Robert Browning — reading, meditating, writing, training himself in the handling of verse. Then for five years he was tutor in the family of Sir John Hartopp at Stoke Newington, a London suburb. For the last three of these years he was also assistant minister at the Mark Lane Independent Chapel in London; and when in 1701 the pastor, Dr. Isaac Chauncy, retired, Watts accepted a call to succeed him.

³ The Hymn-Lover. W. Garrett Horder. P. 98.

His health, however, had never been strong since a serious illness which he had when he was fifteen years old. Moreover, he had none of the modern knowledge of hygiene which enables feeble bodies to defy their limitations. So he indulged himself in hard work and little exercise and sleep cut short, till after a few months in the pastorate another severe illness laid him aside. He must have had much sweetness, intellectual power, and personal attraction to account for the devotion which his congregation, even after so short a connection, showed him, and for their patience with his limitations throughout his long life. In dedicating a volume of sermons to his congregation he wrote: "Two and twenty years are now expired since you first called me to this delightful work. . . . Your forward kindness hath always forbid my requests; nor do I remember that you ever gave me leave to ask anything for myself at your hands, by your constant anticipation of all that I could reasonably desire."⁴

They gave him Rev. Samuel Price as an assistant, and for nine years he was able to take his duties with more or less regularity. Then another long attack of fever was followed by what we should call nervous prostration. Mr. Price now relieved him from most of the duties of his office by becoming co-pastor with him, and one of his friends, Sir Thomas Abney, invited him for a visit to his house at Theobald's, some dozen miles north of London. Watts went for a week, and remained with the family for thirty-six years, as long as he needed an earthly home.

Sir Thomas Abney was wealthy, prominent in city affairs, and, though a Nonconformist, had been in 1700 Lord Mayor of London. Theobald's had been built as a palace by Lord Burleigh, but had been destroyed by the Long Parliament. Part of the splendid garden, however, still remained; and here, overhung by two rows of elms, were a long walk and a summer house, where Watts is said to

⁴ Preface to *Sermons on Various Subjects*. Vol. I.

have composed many of his works. Sir Thomas and Lady Abney were the kindest of friends to him, and their family became his own. Dr. Samuel Johnson found somewhat similar hospitality in the home of Mr. and Mrs. Henry Thrale at Streatham Park; and shortly before Watts went to Sir Thomas Abney's, John Locke ended with his life a fourteen-year visit to Sir Francis and Lady Masham at Oates in Essex. Such a relation between host and guest was close enough to require the distance of politeness and distant enough to exclude close quarreling; though this was hardly the case always between Johnson and the Thrales.

While Watts was living with the Abneys Lady Abney's brother, Thomas Gunston, died, and left to her his manor-house at Stoke Newington, which was then a country village. Some time after, probably about 1735, the Abneys removed to Stoke Newington, though Sir Thomas had died in 1722. Here Watts spent the last thirteen years of his life. He never married; and it was through the three daughters of his hosts, Sarah, Mary, and Elizabeth Abney, that he gained that acquaintance with childhood which led him to become the pioneer in the religious education of children.

His residence with the Abneys did not interrupt his relations with his parish; for whenever he wished to officiate, Lady Abney's carriage was at his disposal, and when he did not feel able, his colleague, Rev. Mr. Price, stood ready to supply his place. The rush of parish work, which in our time drives many a minister to constant busyness and intellectual sterility, did not then exist. The demands of a parish, apart from public services, were much the same as they had been a century before in George Herbert's day; and though the duties of a city minister were naturally more complex than those of a country parson, they were on the same plan. "The Country Parson," says Herbert, "upon the afternoons in the weekdays takes

occasion sometimes to visit in person now one quarter of his Parish, now another. For there he shall find his flock most naturally as they are, wallowing in the midst of their affairs." To live in the country with no household cares, to drive into town and preach occasionally, to have a colleague who should attend to the business of the parish — such conditions would seem to some modern ministers ideal, to others ludicrously insufficient. To Dr. Watts they gave the opportunity of establishing a close bond between himself and his congregation, of gaining a prominent position as a preacher and leader among the Nonconformists, of publishing an amount of prose vast for even a literary person in that voluminous age, of attaining a place — not of the first rank but indisputable — among the poets of the language, and of moulding the thoughts and kindling the emotions of English Protestant Christians for more than a century.

After Sir Thomas Abney's death his widow and her daughters continued to care for their guest with the same munificent and affectionate devotion they had already shown. As he grew feeble a friend asked him one day how he was. "Waiting God's leave to die," he replied. On November 25, 1748, in his seventy-fifth year, the awaited permission came.

In 1722, the University of Edinburgh conferred on him the degree of Doctor of Divinity. He was a voluminous writer; in addition to his poetical works he published on logic, astronomy, geography, grammar, pedagogics, and ethics. He published also in his lifetime three volumes of sermons and twenty-nine treatises on theology. His publications were fifty-two in all. His collected works were issued in London in 1810 in six volumes and again in 1812 in nine volumes. He has a monument in the cemetery in Abney Park, where he is buried, and also in Westminster Abbey, with a memorial hall and a statue in his native Southampton.

It was the need for song better adapted to public worship that led Watts to writing, and it was he who constructed the bridge between the metrical versions of the Psalms and the ampler hymnody of our day. The further pier of his bridge was, it is true, the Psalms in a metrical version. Like Lazarus, he had "come forth," but with the clothes of the dead past still around him. But this version of his was quite different from that of Sternhold and Hopkins, or of Tate and Brady which had preceded it. They had largely confined themselves to a Procrustean arrangement of the Biblical words into lines and feet. But the character of Watts's version was expressed in its title: *The Psalms of David Imitated in the Language of the New Testament*. He never hesitated to read the New Testament into the Old, to substitute gospel for law, to make David sing the song not only of Moses but of the Lamb. Thus where the author of the 103d Psalm says, "Who redeemeth thy life from destruction," Watts amplifies and transforms this into

" 'Tis he, my soul, that sent his Son
To die for crimes that thou hast done."

That Watts had gauged the public need with accuracy is shown by the reception which his Psalms and hymns met. Among the Nonconformists they drove out all others and dominated song in worship for a century. Their influence reached New England somewhat later than their home. *The Bay Psalm Book*, published in 1640, was used here until the middle of the next century, when it was superseded by Tate and Brady, and this toward the end of the century by Watts. A half-century later the Psalms came to be generally disused and a wider range of hymns desired. This led to the publication known as *Watts and Select*, in which to Watts's Psalms and hymns there were added two hundred and thirty-four hymns by different authors.

Two obstacles have prevented a more general appreciation of Watts's poetry. One is the enormous amount of his output and the consequent worthlessness of much of it. Few persons are patient enough to wade through six hundred hymns together with two volumes of other poetry in order to winnow the grain from the chaff. But the nutritive grain is there. The other obstacle is that the hymns are generally regarded from a homiletic rather than a poetic point of view. Their value is supposed to lie in the doctrines which they set forth; and because these doctrines are today for the most part out of fashion, the hymns are relegated to the scrap-heap. But their value lies, as with all poetry, not in inculcating an opinion but in conveying a mood. The background must be granted. The pastoral poetry of the eighteenth century dealt in nymphs and swains, creatures as impossible to find in the country as fairies or salamanders. But granting that the poet chose to employ these figures, the important question is, what did he do with them? So if one would discover the value of Watts, his theological scenery must be assumed. In order to understand him we must see not merely the world but the universe as he saw it. Assume a great Monarch sitting aloft upon a throne, exercising a sway of arbitrary and absolute power over those for whom the poet's favorite designation is "worms of the dust." Never mind whether that is an adequate conception of God, but could there be a more splendid statement of it than this?

"Keep silence, all created things,
And wait your Maker's nod?
My soul stands trembling while she sings
The honours of her God.

Life, death, and hell, and worlds unknown
Hang on his firm decree.
He sits on no precarious throne,
Nor borrows leave to be.

.

Chained to his throne a volume lies,
 With all the fates of men,
 With every angel's form and size,
 Drawn by the eternal pen.

Here he exalts neglected worms
 To sceptres and a crown;
 Anon the following page he turns
 And treads the monarchs down.

Not Gabriel asks the reason why,
 Nor God the reason gives,
 Nor dares the favorite angel pry
 Between the folded leaves.”⁵

Or see the poet again as he stands with bated breath
 before this sovereign presence:

“The Lord! how fearful is his name!
 How wide is his command!
 Nature with all her moving frame
 Rests on his mighty hand.

Immortal glory forms his throne,
 And light his awful robe,
 While with a smile or with a frown
 He manages the globe.

A word of his Almighty breath
 Can swell or sink the seas,
 Build the vast empires of the earth
 Or break them, as he please.

Adoring angels round him fall
 In all their shining forms;
 His sovereign eye looks thro' them all,
 And pities mortal worms.”⁵

This thought of the Divine action as based not upon reasonableness but upon pure will is as inspiring to Watts as it is repulsive to us. He has a thoroughly Hebraic joy in it.

⁵ H. L. P. 9. The references are to any edition of the Psalms and the Three Books of Hymns, and to *Horae Lyricae*, ed. Little, Brown, & Co., Boston, 1854.

" When the Eternal bows the skies
 To visit earthly things,
 With scorn divine he turns his eyes
 From towers of haughty kings;

 Rides on a cloud disdainful by
 A sultan or a czar,
 Laughs at the worms that rise so high,
 Or frowns 'em from afar.

 He bids his awful chariot roll
 Far downward from the skies
 To visit every humble soul,
 With pleasure in his eyes.

 Why should the Lord, that reigns above,
 Disdain so lofty kings ?
 Say, Lord, and why such looks of love
 Upon such worthless things ?

 Mortals, be dumb! What creature dares
 Dispute his awful will!
 Ask no account of his affairs,
 But tremble and be still.

 Just like his nature is his grace,
 All sovereign and all free.
 Great God, how searchless are thy ways!
 How deep thy judgments be! " ⁶

It would be difficult to express the majesty of God more adequately than in the following verses:

" Nature and time quite naked lie
 To thine immense survey,
 From the formation of the sky
 To the great burning day.

 Eternity, with all its years,
 Stands present in thy view;
 To thee there 's nothing old appears;
 Great God, there 's nothing new.

Our lives through various scenes are drawn,
And vexed with trifling cares,
While thine eternal thoughts move on
Their undisturbed affairs.

Great God, how infinite art thou!
What worthless worms are we!
Let the whole race of creatures bow
And pay their praise to thee!"⁷

Again, his heaven may not be ours, but see what a charming place it is. He is as confident in regard to its features and inhabitants as he is of the country around Theobald's. Yet if we smile in the superiority of our knowledge or stiffen up and declare "No such topography for me!" we shall miss the sweetness and felicity of such glad lines as these:

"There is a land of pure delight
Where saints immortal reign;
Infinite day excludes the night,
And pleasures banish pain.

There everlasting Spring abides,
And never-withering flowers;
Death, like a narrow sea, divides
This heavenly land from ours.

Sweet fields beyond the swelling flood
Stand dressed in living green;
So to the Jews old Canaan stood,
While Jordan rolled between."⁸

The incomparable joys of heaven, eagerness to reach it, and the consequent insignificance of death, are his favorite subjects. One leads to another.

"My God, the spring of all my joys,
The life of my delights,
The glory of my brightest days
And comfort of my nights,

⁷ II, 67.

⁸ II, 66.

In darkest shades if he appear,
 My dawning is begun.
 He is my soul's sweet morning-star,
 And he my rising sun.

 My soul would leave this heavy clay
 At that transporting word,
 Run up with joy the shining way
 To embrace my dearest Lord;
 Fearless of hell and ghastly death,
 I'd break through every foe;
 The wings of love and arms of faith
 Should bear me conqueror through."⁹

Those who have known Watts's hymns have perhaps no association with them more sacred than with that one which they have often heard sung by pious fathers and mothers, half in doubting hesitation, half in triumphant confidence:

"When I can read my title clear
 To mansions in the skies,
 I bid farewell to every fear
 And wipe my weeping eyes.
 Should earth against my soul engage
 And hellish darts be hurled,
 Then I can smile at Satan's rage,
 And face a frowning world.
 Let cares like a wild deluge come,
 And storms of sorrow fall;
 May I but safely reach my home,
 My God, my heaven, my all,
 There shall I bathe my weary soul
 In seas of heavenly rest,
 And not a wave of trouble roll
 Across my peaceful breast."¹⁰

Edwin Paxton Hood says: "The gifted nobleman, who was the Mæcenas of the past age, was not an indifferent

⁹ II, 54.

¹⁰ II, 65.

critic, and when called on to cite the most perfect verse in the language, he immediately instanced " the last stanza above quoted."¹¹

Such a celestial prospect makes one long for its realization. Moses was the fortunate one in his death, in spite of his disappointment, for he not only received God's commands but was accompanied at every step by the comforting Divine presence.

" Sweet was the journey to the sky
The wondrous prophet tried;
' Climb up the mount,' says God, ' and die! '
The prophet climbed and died.

Softly his fainting head he lay
Upon his Maker's breast;
His Maker kissed his soul away
And laid his flesh to rest.

In God's own arms he left the breath
That God's own spirit gave.
His was the noblest road to death,
And his the sweetest grave."¹²

With such a blissful transition in view, death is a welcome messenger, and a saint who is dying is to be envied.

" Lord, when we see a saint of thine
Lie gasping out his breath,
With longing eyes and looks divine,
Smiling and pleased in death;

How could we e'en contend to lay
Our limbs upon that bed!
We ask thine envoy to convey
Our spirits in his stead.

Our souls are rising on the wing
To venture in his place,
For when grim Death has lost his sting
He has an angel's face.

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¹¹ Isaac Watts, *His Life and Writings, Homes and Friends*, p. 104.

¹² H. L. P. 129.

Oh! if my threatening sins were gone
 And Death had lost his sting,
 I could invite the angel on,
 And chide his lazy wing.
 Away, these interposing days,
 And let the lovers meet!
 The angel has a cold embrace,
 But kind and soft and sweet.
 I 'd leap at once my seventy years,
 I 'd rush into his arms,
 And lose my breath and all my cares
 Amidst those heavenly charms.
 Joyful, I 'd lay this body down
 And leave the lifeless clay,
 Without a sigh, without a groan,
 And stretch and soar away." ¹³

However we may portray heaven, we are apt to be squeamish about depicting hell, even if we concede its existence. Though we may take symbols for realities elsewhere, we never think of regarding the condition depicted in Dante's *Inferno* as a statement of fact. But Watts saw no reason for restraining his imagination in describing a locality which to him was as real as the slums of London. Moreover, the homiletic fashion of the Middle Ages, when the torture of criminals was common and frequently a public spectacle, had not ceased in Watts's day, as indeed it has not wholly in some quarters at present, and preachers were accustomed to balance their exhibition of the splendors of heaven by lurid descriptions, reeking with brimstone and bristling with horrors, of the torments of hell. Watts is much more restrained than most of these, both in quantity and quality. His hymns on this subject are comparatively few. The worst of them is the following:

" My thoughts on awful subjects roll,
 Damnation and the dead;
 What horrors seize the guilty soul
 Upon a dying bed!

Lingering about these mortal shores
 She makes a long delay,
 Till like a flood with rapid force,
 Death sweeps the wretch away.
 Then swift and dreadful she descends
 Down to the fiery coast
 Amongst abominable fiends,
 Herself a frightened ghost.
 There endless crowds of sinners lie,
 And darkness makes their chains;
 Tortured with keen despair they cry,
 Yet wait for fiercer pains.
 Not all their anguish and their blood
 For their old guilt atones,
 Nor the compassion of a God
 Shall hearken to their groans.
 Amazing grace, that kept my breath,
 Nor bid my soul remove
 Till I had learned my Saviour's death,
 And well insured his love! " ¹⁴

It is difficult, in view of such verses, to keep the compact we made with the poet, and, while appreciating his poetry as poetry, let him display his theology unprotected.

His tendency to visualize scenes makes almost every description vivid. One would hardly suppose a study in anatomy could be put into a hymn; but Watts accomplishes this feat, and makes the anatomy thoroughly poetic.

" Let others boast how strong they be,
 Nor death nor danger fear;
 But we 'll confess, O Lord, to thee
 What feeble things we are.

Our life contains a thousand springs,
 And dies if one be gone.
 Strange, that a harp of thousand strings
 Should keep in tune so long!

He spoke, and straight our hearts and brains
 In all their motions rose.
 'Let blood,' said he, 'flow round the veins!'
 And round the veins it flows.

While we have breath to use our tongues,
 Our Maker we'll adore.
 His spirit moves our heaving lungs,
 Or they would breathe no more."¹⁵

I said it is difficult in reading some of Watts's hymns, to take them for their poetic worth and not cry out on their theology. It is especially hard for a child-lover when the poet faces the dualism at the base of his system of theologic thought and carries it unflinchingly to its logical conclusion. The Latin mind had from the first posited an opposition between the Divine and the human. Whatever is of the one is not of the other; the Divine is non-human, the human non-Divine. It follows that certain departments belong to God, certain others to man. "The heaven, even the heavens, are the Lord's; but the earth hath He given to the children of men." The torturing dilemma then presents itself, Which shall I love, my friends or God? Not both, for what is given to the one can but be just so much taken from the other. I ought to love God supremely, but can I refrain from loving my friends? Many a tender conscience has been thus plunged into torment because it has not understood the First Epistle of St. John. Watts felt obliged to versify on all the doctrines of his theology, and therefore on this. If we have an eye for beauty rather than for dogmatics, we may forgive him his poem for the sake of one line in it.

"Where'er my flattering passions rove
 I find a lurking snare;
 'Tis dangerous to let loose our love
 Beneath the Eternal Fair.

Souls which the tie of friendship binds,
 And partners of our blood,
 Seize a large portion of our minds,
 And leave the less for God.

Nature has soft but powerful bands,
 And reason she controls,
 While children, with their little hands,
 Hang closest to our souls.

Thoughtless, they act the old serpent's part.
 What tempting things they be!
 Lord, how they twine about our heart
 And draw it off from thee!

.

Dear Sovereign, break these fetters off,
 And set our spirits free!
 God in himself is bliss enough,
 For we have all in thee."¹⁶

We may well overlook the dreadfulness of his doctrine for the sake of the felicitous tenderness of that line,

“What tempting things they be!”

Watts himself seems to have felt that the poem needed some excuse, for he never included it among his hymns, and to the section of poems of which this is the first he added a note, saying that it may be an apology for what may displease in them that they were written “in his youngest years.” Moreover, he was regardlessly illogical in his practice, and refused to dismiss the love of children as infringing on love to God; for he was fond of children and devoted to the daughters of Sir Thomas and Lady Abney. Much theology which he felt bound to hold he, like other people, found it convenient to be not held by.

But more than this, he was the first to recognize that children had poetic rights and to give them a place in literature. In all Chaucer's crowded picture-gallery there is no portrait of a child; for the only tale bearing on the

¹⁶ H. L. P. 103.

subject is a monkish legend,¹⁷ and its subject is as far from being a real child as is the hero of an infant biography in a Sunday School library. Spenser has nothing to do with children. Shakespeare deals with them only four brief times.¹⁸ Milton, apart from his youthful poem on the Death of a Fair Infant, does not mention them; for though the actors of "Comus" were originally children, the characters in the Masque are mature. Dean Colet had cast on them a kindly eye, and had endeavored to soften the asperities of learning for them.¹⁹ But that child-world, whose discovery has been so marked a feature of the last fifty years, was unknown in the seventeenth century, and Isaac Watts was the Columbus who brought it into notice. Not that he had that interest in the study of children in themselves, that absorption in the charm of their looks and ways, that admission of their concerns to a level in dignity and importance with those of older people, which characterize modern child-worship. These have been later developments. To him, as to his contemporaries and our own benighted grandparents, children were to be seen and not heard, and they must ever be taught subordination, obedience, and their own comparative unimportance. But Watts had a profound interest in their education, especially their education in religion. He en-

¹⁷ *The Prioresses Tale*.

¹⁸ Cf. *King John*, *King Henry V*, *Coriolanus*, *Macbeth*.

¹⁹ In the Latin Grammar which he wrote for his school of St. Paul's he says: "For the love and zeal that I have to the new school of Paul's and to the children of the same, I have of the eight parts of grammar made this little book. In which, if any new things be of me, it is alonely that I have put these parts in a more clear order, and I have made them a little more easy to young wits than (methinketh) they were before; judging that nothing may be too soft nor too familiar for little children, specially learning a tongue unto them all strange. In which little book I have left many things out of purpose, considering the tenderness and small capacity of little minds. . . . Wherefore I pray you, all little babes, all little children, learn gladly this little treatise and commend it diligently unto your memories, trusting that of this beginning that ye shall proceed and grow to perfect literature, and come at the last to be great clerks. And lift up your little white hands for me, which prayeth for you to God, to whom be all honour and imperial majesty and glory. Amen." *The Oxford Reformers: Frederic Seebohm*; p. 214.

deavored to construct a path from the school-books, to which they were driven by duty, into a field of literature to which they would resort of themselves. The path, it is true, conducted, not as with the children's books of today, to the flowery meadows of unhampered amusement, but to the uplands of morality and religion. But it was a pleasant path, adapted to little feet; and if a finger-post every now and then was pointing a didactic moral, why, that was only what every child expected and every grown person would have been shocked to find absent. So Dr. Watts issued a book, *Divine and Moral Songs*, parts of which, it is safe to say, have become almost as classic in the childish world as Mother Goose. Few well-bred children of the past generation — I cannot speak with as much knowledge of those of the present — did not know

“ Whatever brawls disturb the street,
 There should be peace at home;
 Where sisters dwell and brothers meet,
 Quarrels should never come.
 Birds in their little nests agree;
 And 'tis a shameful sight
 When children of one family
 Fall out, and chide, and fight.” ²⁰

And

“ Let dogs delight to bark and bite,
 For God hath made them so.
 Let bears and lions growl and fight,
 For 'tis their nature too.
 But, children, you should never let
 Such angry passions rise;
 Your little hands were never made
 To tear each other's eyes.” ²¹

And

“ How doth the little busy bee
 Improve each shining hour,
 And gather honey all the day
 From every opening flower!

²⁰ H. L. P. 317.

²¹ Ibid. P. 316.

How skilfully she builds her cell!
How neat she spreads the wax!
And labors hard to store it well
With the sweet food she makes!

In works of labour or of skill
I would be busy too;
For Satan finds some mischief still
For idle hands to do.”²²

His Cradle Hymn, “Hush, my Dear, lie still and slumber,” has crooned many a tired child to sleep. These *Divine and Moral Songs* deserve remembrance and respect not only as pioneers in literature for children but for the intrinsic merit of many of them. “Edition after edition rapidly issued from the press in England and America, and translations have since appeared in many of the European and transatlantic languages. The number of copies that have been circulated throughout the world must amount to many millions; upwards of thirty millions in this country are regularly kept in print; and, upon a moderate computation, the average annual sale in England only cannot be less than eighty thousand.”²³

In summing up the characteristics of Watts’s poetry we may place first its reverence. It was a time when the thought of the immanence of God in nature and in man had almost fallen out of sight. The devout Christian of our day sees God around him so constantly, though he may not always call the higher element in life which he sees by the name of God, that the Divine presence is no surprise to him; he takes it as a matter of course. But to the men of the eighteenth century, filled as they were with the thought of the Divine transcendence, it was always a wonder and a surprise when the heavens or the earth opened and behind the visible they beheld God. They

²² H. L. P. 320.

²³ Thomas Milner: *The Life, Times, and Correspondence of Rev. Isaac Watts*, p. 372.

delighted, as they expressed it, to "see God in His works"; and in the fields decked with flowers, the towering mountain, the roaring sea, the glittering night sky, it was not directly beauty that they saw but the Jehovah of the Old Testament suddenly revealed, and before such an immediate vision they bow in awe. This attitude of worship is the chief characteristic of the best work of Watts. He is occupied with the deepest subjects which can interest men and which must interest them perpetually. They wear in him, however, the dress of his day, and this unfortunately often repels us. But beneath their dress lies their kinship with the souls of every age. These subjects he always treats with befitting dignity. More than that, when he approaches God there is ever with him the sense of awe; he bows low in the Divine presence. And as this is the subject of profoundest interest to him, it is the field of his most satisfactory work. He is almost unique in his ability to convey the impression of sublimity. His Muse is best when she walks with an *incedo regina* air. It is sometimes supposed that the Puritan mind had little interest in poetry. That interest is often underestimated. But as the central doctrine of Calvinism was the absoluteness of God, that poetry was chiefly interesting to the Puritan which exhibited this absoluteness in all its grandeur. It was partly for this reason that Watts had so strong a hold upon minds which inherited the Puritan tradition. In the austere doctrines which they held he showed them the springs of feeling.

This is the second characteristic of his poetry — its passion. His verses are by no means mere rhymed theology, but they are the outpouring of the effect of theology upon a sensitive and eager soul. He has not only found, as an earnest thinker might, the meat for daily life lying hidden in theologic doctrines, but he has discovered the joy in them, the dread, the inspiration, the bliss. He carries them over from the domain of thought into that of feeling,

and in giving us their emotional value, awakens it in us. The Puritan, contrary again to the popular impression, was not an unemotional person, though it took something of the eternal to touch his emotions; but when they were touched, they burned with a deep and consuming fire. Lord Rosebery in one of his speeches says, "The Puritan was a practical mystic, the most formidable and terrible of all combinations." In a sermon on the use of the passions in religion Watts exclaims:

"Have they [preachers] no such thing as passion belonging to them? . . . Have they no springs of affection within them? or do they think their hearers have none? Or is passion so vile a power that it must be all devoted to things of flesh and sense, and must never be applied to things divine and heavenly? Who taught any of us this lazy and drowsy practice? . . . Did the great God ever appoint statues for his ambassadors to invite sinners to his mercy? Words of grace written upon brass or marble would do the work almost as well. . . . How careless and indolent is a whole assembly when the preacher appears like a lifeless engine, pronouncing words of law or grace, when he speaks of divine things in such a cold and formal manner, as though they had no influence upon his own heart! When the words freeze upon his lips, the hearts of hearers are freezing also."

The Romantic Movement had not yet awakened men to behold the world; but that enthusiasm which the Romanticist came to feel for the world of Nature, Watts felt for what he would have called the world of grace; but his world, instead of having for its contents hills and fields, had whatever concerned God, the human soul, and salvation. If the Church of England could have recognized the value of emotion in religion and found a place for it within her respectable doors, the Methodist Movement, of which it was the very life-blood, would probably not have resulted in secession. But during Watts's boyhood Dr. South was denouncing enthusiasm as worse than popery; "a monster," he calls it, "from whose teeming womb have issued some of the vilest, the foulest, the most absurd practices and opinions that the nature of man (as corrupt as it

is) was ever poisoned and polluted with.”²⁴ A generation before the Wesleys and Doddridge taught people to sing their religion, Watts was preparing the ground by pouring forth psalms and hymns which were full of ardent religious feeling.

Another characteristic of his poetry is its introspection. In this, it is true, he is not alone, for most religious poetry down to comparatively recent times has been occupied chiefly with religion in its relation to the individual. It was the distinctive note of Puritanism that the human soul and God are the two great objects which fill its vision. “God and I; I and God,” was the solemn chant sounding perpetually through the chambers in which the devout Puritan soul dwelt. The modern development of a social conscience had not yet awakened men to the complexity of the soul and therefore to its corporate relations with others. So Watts, like other devout singers, sees primarily the Jacob’s Ladder connecting heaven with himself. His introspection, however, we may perhaps say, has a somewhat different emphasis from that of George Herbert, for example, a century earlier. Herbert, in meditating on his soul and God, fixes his gaze more on God — His outgoing bounteousness, His unwearied search for men, His familiar converse with them. It is the angels descending that he sees. Watts is apt to give attention rather to the other end of the Ladder — the condition of his own soul and the ascending angels. He rejoices that he is among the saved; he wonders whether he is; he is overcome at the thought that it is for him that Christ died; he examines what came to be called, in the curious religious phraseology of the day, his “frames.” This, however, is not mere egotism, for he regards himself as a type of every earnest Christian. But he gave a strong impetus to religion as a personal experience, to what was called “experimental religion,” which pressed upon every one the insistent question “Are you a

²⁴ South’s Sermons; Satan Himself Transformed into an Angel of Light.

Christian ? ” The question would probably never have occurred to Herbert, so much would it have been for him a matter of course. To Watts, and even more to the generation following, it was the universal question of vital importance. The strength of the Church of Rome lies in her utilization of those sides of human nature in which choice is not directly involved, which are appealed to by the institutions of religion. Much of the strength of Protestantism lies in her call to the will, to personal affirmation. This has been a marked characteristic in that strong type of personality which has been so prominent a feature in Protestantism. Protestantism and individualism are near of kin.

To these characteristics of Watts's poetry must be joined another — a certain love of beauty. The assiduous study of nature had, as I said, not then arisen. But Watts has an eye for the country landscape as he walks

“ Abroad in the meadows to see the young lambs
Run sporting about by the side of their dams,
With fleeces so clean and so white; ”

and he exclaims

“ How fair is the rose! What a beautiful flower!
The glory of April and May! ”

He feels the calm of a summer evening:

“ How fine has the day been, how bright was the sun!
How lovely and joyful the course that he run,
Though he rose in a mist when his race he begun,
And there followed some droopings of rain!
But now the fair traveller's come to the west,
His rays are all gold and his beauties are best;
He paints the skies gay as he sinks to his rest,
And foretells a bright rising again.” ²⁵

But it is chiefly in his literary style that he shows his eye for beauty, or perhaps we might rather say for form.

²⁵ H. L. P. 345.

Dr. Johnson declares of him: "He was one of the first authors that taught the Dissenters to court attention by the graces of language. Whatever they had among them before, whether of learning or acuteness, was commonly obscured and blunted by coarseness and inelegance of style."²⁶ This verdict is supported by a passage in a letter from Enoch Watts to his brother Isaac, in which he says: "A load of scandal lies on the Dissenters only for their imagined aversion to poetry." Isaac Watts insists on the importance of beauty and therefore of poetry, and in poetry, of fit and beautiful expression. To appreciate the innovating character of the following passage we must remember that in his time poetry, like novels, was regarded by the pious as "worldly":

"The profanation and debasement of so divine an art has tempted some weaker Christians to imagine that poetry and vice are naturally akin; or, at least, that verse is only fit to recommend trifles and entertain our looser hours, but it is too light and trivial a method to treat anything that is serious and sacred. They submit, indeed, to use it in divine psalmody; but they love the driest translation of the Psalm best. They will venture to sing a dull hymn or two at church in tunes of equal dulness; but still they persuade themselves and their children that the beauties of poetry are vain and dangerous. All that arises above Mr. Sternhold is too airy for worship, and hardly escapes the sentence of 'unclean and abominable.'"²⁷

Felicities of expression are continually occurring in his verse. Thus he says:

"There 's nothing round this spacious earth
That suits my large desire" (II, 10).

His spirit would fly above, within the starry heavens,

"Beyond those crystal vaults
And all their sparkling balls;
They 're but the porches to thy courts,
And paintings on thy walls" (H. L., p. 71).

²⁶ *Lives of the Poets*. Vol. II, p. 453.

²⁷ H. L. Preface, p. lxxxii.

"Lord, when I quit this earthly stage,
 Where shall I fly but to thy breast ?
 For I have sought no other home,
 For I have learned no other rest " (II, 100).

"In all my vast concerns with thee,
 In vain my soul would try
 To shun thy presence, Lord, or flee
 The notice of thine eye.

O wondrous knowledge, deep and high!
 Where can a creature hide ?
 Within thy circling arms I lie,
 Beset on every side! " (Ps. 139).

"Thy words the raging winds controul,
 And rule the boisterous deep;
 Thou mak'st the sleeping billows roll,
 The rolling billows sleep " (Ps. 89).

"Lo, what a glorious sight appears
 To our believing eyes!
 The earth and seas are passed away,
 And the old rolling skies.

His own soft hand shall wipe the tears
 From every weeping eye,
 And pains and groans and griefs and fears
 And death itself shall die " (I, 21).

The similarity of thought in the lines beginning

"My mind to me a kingdom is,"

which, dating a century before Watts, are ascribed both to Edward Dyer and to William Byrd, does not take from the dignity and felicity of Watts's "True Riches":

"I am not concerned to know
 What to-morrow fate will do;
 'Tis enough that I can say,
 I've possessed myself to-day.
 Then if haply midnight death
 Seize my flesh and stop my breath,

Yet to-morrow I shall be
 Heir to the best part of me.
 Glittering stones, and golden things,
 Wealth and honours that have wings,
 Ever fluttering to be gone,
 I could never call my own.
 Riches that the world bestows
 She can take and I can lose;
 But the treasures that are mine
 Lie afar beyond her line.
 When I view my spacious soul,
 And survey myself a whole,
 And enjoy myself alone,
 I'm a kingdom of my own." (H. L., p. 182).

The solemn dirge of the ninetyeth Psalm is almost as impressive in Watts's version as in the stately words of King James's translators:

" Our God, our help in ages past,
 Our hope for years to come,
 Our shelter from the stormy blast,
 And our eternal home,

Under the shadow of thy throne
 Thy saints have dwelt secure;
 Sufficient is thine arm alone,
 And our defence is sure.

Before the hills in order stood
 Or earth received her frame,
 From everlasting thou art God,
 To endless years the same.

A thousand ages in hy sight
 Are like an evening gone,
 Short as the watch that ends the night
 Before the rising sun.

Time, like an ever-rolling stream,
 Bears all its sons away;
 They fly forgotten, as a dream
 Dies at the opening day.

Our God, our help in ages past,
 Our hope for years to come,
 Be thou our guard while troubles last,
 And our eternal home! "

When I remarked that Watts has a certain love of beauty I meant, as we generally mean by the phrase, an uncertain one. His aim — let me say it again — is ever homiletical; and not being interested in pure beauty for its own sake, he can do violence to it in ways which would be those of a ruffian if they were not merely those of a preacher. Thus he never lets imperfect rhymes stand in his way. He rhymes *wing* and *begin* (II, 58.3), *not* and *thoughts* (III, 6.1), *tune* and *throne* (III, 8.1), *bliss* and *trees* (II, 16.5), *me* and *sea* (I, 127.2). Of this last we may say, "But that is all right." But according to the pronunciation of his day, it was not, for the latter word was then pronounced *say*.²⁸ When he is under headway he does not pause to make his rhyming-scheme consistent. Instead of *abab*, as in the rest of the hymn, he puts in *abcb* (I, 108.1). He shows at times shockingly bad taste, as for example:

"Here we behold His bowels roll
 As kind as when He died,
 And see the sorrows of His soul
 Bleed through His wounded side " (III, 4.6).

And when our great-grandparents laid away their loved dead, and the otherwise beautiful hymn, "Why do we mourn departing friends?" rose to the mournful wail of "China," how it must have jarred painfully to come to the third stanza:

²⁸ "God moves in a mysterious way
 His wonders to perform;
 He plants His footsteps in the sea,
 And rides upon the storm." *Cowper*.

"Here thou, great Anna, whom three realms obey,
 Dost sometimes counsel take and sometimes tea."

Pope; Rape of the Lock. III, 7.

“ Why should we tremble to convey
 Their bodies to the tomb ?
 There the dear flesh of Jesus lay,
 And left a long perfume ” (II, 3.3).

He worked at the technique of his art, and his work shows. His lines flow smoothly and swiftly, without break. He never embarrasses the sense to fit the metre. He is skillful in varying the *cæsura*, and in the use of lines end-stopped and run on. He experimented with various kinds of verse, and the result exhibits skill. Here he is wielding Sapphic hendecasyllables:

“ When the fierce north wind with his airy forces
 Rears up the Baltic to a foaming fury,
 And the red lightning with a storm of hail comes
 Rushing amain down,

How the poor sailors stand amazed and tremble!
 While the hoarse thunder, like a bloody trumpet,
 Roars a loud onset to the gaping waters,
 Quick to devour them.

Such shall the noise be and the wild disorder
 (If things eternal may be like these earthly),
 Such the dire terror, when the great archangel
 Shakes the creation.” ²⁹

But there is an appalling amount in his output. One hundred and fifty Psalms, each in many cases in several different metres — Long, Short, Common, Particular — three hundred and sixty-five hymns, thirty-six “Divine and Moral Songs,” two unassorted books of hymns and lyrical poems — it is enough to daunt the stoutest seeker for poetic gold. Knowing that most of such a mass must be but dust, one wishes for a sifter to make a selection from his poems, as Matthew Arnold did for Wordsworth. This indeed has been accomplished automatically. The compilers of hymn-books have taken what they found valuable and incorporated it in their publications, and the

²⁹ H. L. P. 74.

bulk of this has been very considerable. *The Sabbath Hymn Book*, published in 1858, contains two hundred and fifty-five hymns by Watts. The number in more recent publications is less, owing to the change in popular theology in the last half-century. But take almost any hymn-book of the present day, and it will be found that Watts has contributed to it more than any other writer.

I said his hymns are not mere rhymed theology, though they aimed to be theology — that is, Calvinism — in rhyme. His God is the Hebrew Jehovah unmodified. His theory of the Atonement is bloody substitutionalism; his hell is material and perpetual. But he aimed to do something more than put Calvinism into verse; he aimed to give its emotional value. And as we look over his most repellent lines, we shall find almost all of them bathed in an atmosphere of feeling, and gaining a respect, a worth, and often a beauty thereby. Yet while he accepted the Calvinism of his day, a kindly heart compelled him, as it has done so many others, to modify illogically its severities.

“That spirit led him to declare his persuasion that heathens and savages who never heard of the gospel, are not left to perish unavoidably without any hope or any grace to trust in; but if there be found among them any who fear God and work righteousness, they shall be accepted of Him, through an unknown Mediator, as Cornelius was. It led him to entertain a curious opinion concerning the souls of those who die in infancy. The execrable notion that they are condemned to eternal punishment for their portion of original sin, he utterly rejected. . . . Rather than condemn them to a wretched resurrection for the purpose of being condemned, he would have chosen to believe in a metempsychosis, and that the soul on its early separation from one body entered into another, in which it might go through that state of trial on which its eternal destiny might equitably depend. But in his judgment it was more likely, as more consonant with Scripture, that they underwent, in its strict and final sense, the penalty of temporal death denounced against all the race of Adam, and that there was no resurrection appointed for them.”³⁰

³⁰ Southey's *Life of Isaac Watts*, in *Horae Lyricae*. P. xxxix.

And this loop-hole he enlarged yet more favorably, for he held that the infant children of the elect would be regarded as part of their parents, and so exempt from annihilation and accepted under the covenant of grace. With all his picturesque location of heaven and hell, he catches a glimpse of modern Broad Churchism, and recognizes the destiny of the soul as established automatically:

“Perhaps it may be furnished with some new vehicle of more refined matter; perhaps it may abide where death finds it — in anywhereness or nowhereness, not changing its place but only its manner of thinking and acting and its mode of existence, and without removal finding itself in heaven or hell according to its consciousness of its own deserts.”³¹

This kindness of heart obliged him to make a survey for himself of the strait and narrow way, and to come to the following conclusion: “I am persuaded there is a breadth in the narrow road to heaven, and persons may travel more than seven abreast in it.”³²

One cannot claim for Watts a place in the first rank of poets. He only occasionally steps into the second rank. He is not likely to be among those whom we take down from our shelves to read in the half-hour when we crave to have the drab dullness of ordinary life gilded with an inspiring glow. Yet when we take his hand, he may lead us into the domain of the eternal, and as we behold him kneeling there in joy and awe we become aware that we are in the presence of God. He was the first Englishman who set the gospel to music, and in his special field of song he has never been surpassed.

³¹ Southey's *Life of Isaac Watts*, in *Horae Lyricae*. P. lv.

³² *Ibid.* P. xxxix.

THE REASONABLE APPEAL OF THE BOOK OF REVELATION

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In the popular mind, the Book of Revelation is doubtless the most difficult of all New Testament writings. Whether it deserves that reputation may well be doubted, for there are other books of the Bible in which scholars would probably say that the unsolved problems are more fundamental. But the Book of Revelation stands at the end of the collection, and few readers penetrate so far. It seems remote from modern habits of thought and expression. It lends itself for the most part less readily to the practical, if sometimes superficial, use of the ordinary reader.

This sense of the difficulty of the book is no merely modern phenomenon. Among certain groups of the past, to be sure, Revelation has ever been a favorite book. The dreamers about the future have enjoyed it, and used its prophecies to frame their own pictures of what they hoped for. The insurgents against established order have turned to their own account its fierce reproaches against a tyrannous civilization. The oppressed have found in it comfort. But with those men of the ancient Church with whom we as educated men and rational thinkers have most sympathy, the scholars of the Greek Church, we find a different attitude. Revelation was, indeed, at the outset generally accepted. In the second century it was among the earliest books to be included in the growing New Testament. Hardly anyone doubted its right to be counted there. Yet in the third century the Greek theologians of Alexandria — Origen and those whom he influ-

enced — were repelled by it, as are many today. Scholarly training could not understand it, and could not reconcile itself to its strange thought and grotesque expression. Origen, in that century, retained the book, but he made no secret of his unsympathetic attitude; and those who came after him found ground for denying that it had been written by an Apostle, and so for excluding it from the New Testament. For centuries it was in debate in the Greek Church. The great Syrian Church — farther in the East — had its New Testament from the Greeks, and received it without the Book of Revelation, so that to this day it is not a part of the official Syrian New Testament.

The Roman Church of the early centuries, more dependent on authority and tradition, less accustomed to independent rational reflection, held fast to this ancient document, and it was largely through Roman influence that the Revelation was finally accepted by the Greeks. But its history from the third to the fifth century shows that it presented to our spiritual ancestors difficulties similar to those which it has offered to many of us.

What is the reason for this difficulty which the book has caused? It is due mainly to the fact that the original readers for whom the book was intended lived in a different intellectual world from us and from Origen. The literature they read has only in part survived, the ideas which made their background have given place to others. They knew and loved this kind of prophetic vision; to us it is foreign. They recognized its purpose and understood its method; for us these things have all to be reconstructed by an effort of the imagination, and through the aid of erudition, often drawn from fields but rarely entered.

In consequence of this the mode of approach to the book has generally been radically wrong. The method of explanation adopted has not suited the nature and structure of the thing to be explained, and thus for the most part

interpretation has only involved in darkness the secrets which this book was meant to throw into the highest light.

About the Book of Revelation hundreds of books have been written. Most of them — including some of the longest — are worthless. Even the genius of Sir Isaac Newton added less than nothing to that great man's fame when it exercised itself upon this theme. Learning, ingenuity, infinite labor have all proved to be wasted when guided by a perverse theory of what was to be sought. In all intellectual effort aptness in framing the right question is the most important art, the highest flower of scholarship. The failure of interpretation of the Book of Revelation has been due to defective judgment at that point.

The older interpreters were apt to seek in the book an historical picture of worldly events which were future to the writer, and which are known to us from the later course of history. As a prophet he foresaw and foretold the future. With great ingenuity and in very variant ways the commentator's place in the great drama was elicited. The events portrayed up to that point were identified with known historic facts. The enemies who are brought upon the scene with such distinctness, and devoted so confidently to destruction, were always his own, the learned and earnest commentator's, peculiar enemies. Against them he was thus able to quote the authority of holy writ. Of their speedy downfall he had comfortable assurance.

If you were a heretic or a schismatic, you believed that the Pope of Rome and the organized Church were the great foes of truth and righteousness, and you would be able to declare them to be the Beast and the False Prophet, and to find in the history of their misdeeds the events prophesied by the ancient seer. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the book was abundantly used by the partisans of the Emperor against the Pope. But if in that same period you were Pope Innocent III, you

could gain by the same method a prophetic denunciation of the Saracens and Mohammed, and could reckon out the predestined length of their power. If, somewhat later, you were a Protestant, the enemy was the papacy. Romanist writers have believed the book to foretell the wickedness of Martin Luther, whom the Lutherans on the contrary found referred to as the angel "flying in mid-heaven, having an eternal gospel to proclaim unto them that dwell on the earth," and saying "with a great voice, 'Fear God and give him glory . . . and worship him that hath made the heaven and the earth and sea and fountains of waters.'"

According to your politics it was possible to direct the thunders of the Holy Bible against Napoleon Bonaparte, or the liberal movement of 1848, when Satan was loosed, or the power of the Slavic and German Empires, concealed under the names of Gog and Magog. The appalling catastrophe of the Great War of today has called forth similar interpretations.

And the numbers in the book, the thousand years, the forty and two months, the 1260 days, the mystic 666, lent themselves to endless fascinating calculations of just how long these various powers of evil should be permitted to exercise their baneful sway, and how soon the people of God might hope for final divine intervention.

This method of interpretation was obviously useful, but as obviously unsafe and unconvincing. It contained the seed of its own destruction, and could only lead to the abandonment of all use of the book. As a heaven-bestowed eternal calendar, the book proved a failure; as a philosophy of modern history, its point of view was indeterminable.

Throughout Christian history, however, and in recent years with great seriousness a wholly different and far more sober mode of approach to the book has been followed, and has been advocated with vast learning. In

this majestic picture, it is said, the author is not prophesying the historical future now known to us, but reflects the events and conditions of his own time as he knew it. These enemies from the Euphrates were the Parthians in one of their incursions upon the civilized world; the earthquakes and wars are to be identified with the events of the first century; the flight of the woman is the retreat of the Christians from Jerusalem before the siege. We have to look not for prophecy, but for history, known to the writer, and re-told by him in figure and symbol in order to show that in his time the prophecies of old have been fulfilled, that the end of all things has arrived, and that the great deliverance stands before the door ready now to enter, bringing divine succor and victory to the elect.

This general view, the archæological and historical interpretation of the book from the events of the writer's time, has in it much that is true, and it prevailed among the wise scholars of the later nineteenth century, but it breaks down when applied in detail as a complete explanation of the dramatic story. No satisfactory historical sequence can be made out, and this whole system of interpretation fails to do justice to the plain intention of the writer to offer prophecy, not history. A book like Daniel, written in the second century before Christ in the name of a faithful hero of four hundred years earlier, can naturally put into his mouth prophecies after the event, relating to the intervening course of historical affairs between Daniel and the writer, but the Book of Revelation purports to be written not by a leader of the past but by a contemporary. The seer is expressly told, "Seal not up the words of the prophecy of this book; for the time is at hand. . . . Behold, I come quickly"; the Lord "sent his angel to show unto his servants the things which must shortly come to pass."

These methods of attack upon the problem, then, are unsuccessful, and leave it a hard book. How shall it be

made easier ? With what key shall we essay to unlock its secret ?

To this question the only real answer is the successful application of the right key. We may, however, with profit indicate some of the methods which present-day study of Revelation employs, and which make easier this book which has seemed so hard.

In the first place may be put a simpler and less sophisticated attitude toward the book. It must be taken for what it purports to be, if it is to be understood. Older interpreters tried to find in it a panorama of modern history based on supernatural knowledge; later scholars thought the writer was giving us a great symbolic picture of his own times based on observation and information. These were assumptions, sophisticated views founded on the belief that an inspired book must have a certain character and reveal certain things. Let us permit the book to teach us what it will, not what we will. Let us avoid reading into it things and ideas that only a person who can look back on nearly two millenniums of history since the birth of Christ could possibly know. Is not this a more reverent, as it is certainly a more fruitful, mode of approach to any book of the New Testament ?

With this simpler attitude to the book belongs a right view of the nature of prophecy and of vision. Prophecy is not a chronicle unrolled from the wrong end, a mere history read beforehand. The significance of prophecy does not lie in useless information about events of the future which it is divinely empowered to convey, information which is interesting solely as a miracle. Its significance lies in the great principles of God's activity which it has been vouchsafed to the prophet to grasp. His account of the future is really a statement of one way in which these principles might work out, and is always figurative, symbolic, and in large measure vague. In the nature of the case, insofar as a prophecy is definite, it will generally be

wrong. This view of prophecy makes it possible for us to approach this book with simple-minded readiness to take what it gives us, and without feeling the necessity of somehow transforming its prophetic pictures into correspondence with what we suppose to be the facts intended.

Similarly the modern conception of the nature of visions enables us to understand better this book of visions. Visions take place, and they may be involuntary. But in them is used the material with which the seer's mind and imagination are already filled. The elements of which they are made — the stuff of these dreams — are ideas drawn from many quarters and often traceable. The value of a vision does not come from its supernaturalness as attested by its inexplicability, but depends rather on the moral and spiritual worth of the idea which it enshrines and expresses. For these reasons a sharp and strict line cannot be drawn between visions as involuntary experiences, later written down, and visions as a literary form. Both are the work of the imagination, operating in much the same way. The seer may often not know whether he thought he saw with inner vision these things of the spiritual world, or whether he only described them as if he had seen. And it makes but little difference to us which was the case. Sheer supernaturalness has no inherent moral or spiritual value. In a book like the Revelation we must treat the complicated series as having a rational unity and relation of parts. Many signs betray artistic adjustment and careful plan, the use of earlier materials, the weaving of them together by the cunning thought and skill of an author. That he had visions, and many of these very visions, who shall deny? But this book is no fortuitous accumulation of separate atoms; it is an organic system of visions, not a dream tale.

This leads us to the second method of modern study which makes this Apocalypse easier. It is the comparative study of apocalyptic writing as a branch of Jewish

and Christian literature. We have here no isolated instance of this kind of book, but only one branch of a great, wide-spreading tree. Apocalypses were merely the form which Jewish prophecy took in the later days of Jewish history and which was imitated by Christian writers. The greatest of Jewish apocalyptic writings is the book of Daniel. With it seems to start the series, which includes the Books of Enoch, in themselves a whole library of apocalypses, the Assumption of Moses, the Apocalypse of Baruch, the Apocalypse of Ezra (II Esdras of the English Apocrypha). The Christian writings in which the long list was continued are mostly little known, and their names need not be recounted. From the ancient Apocalypses of Peter and Paul through many later examples down to modern times we have such books.

These books are prophecies; and here it is worth while to pause and notice the difference between a Utopia and an Apocalypse. A utopia sets forth an ideal condition of human society, as it might conceivably develop. Plato, in his *Republic*, Sir Thomas More, the modern Socialists, and countless other portrayers of an imaginary perfect state have thought out and described how they would like the world to be. The writers of apocalypses have not done this. They have observed, or have apprehended by faith, the forces at work in the world, and have assessed in the light of faith their present and future relative strength, and so have described not what the world ought to be, but what it will be. As with all prophets, the moral and religious value of their work lies not in their success in hitting on the right details of the future development of the world's history, but on their insight in seeing the deep forces and their interplay. The final outcome of any apocalypse written from the theistic point of view must of course be the triumph of God, however brought about. But the forces now working may be leading primarily and directly to a very different goal. Hopefulness of the ulti-

mate issue may be entirely consistent with despair as to the immediate and temporary outcome.¹

The Book of Revelation thus becomes intelligible when it is recognized that it is written in part by the conventional methods which can be studied in other writings of its class.

A third method of modern study is also important. The material of apocalypses, the figures and symbols, the locusts, the dragon, the scarlet woman, the tree of life, the sea of glass mingled with fire, the horsemen, the harvesters, the gates of pearl, the walls of precious stones, the river of life — these and countless more, smaller and greater, are not here used for the first time. They do not spring directly from the needs of the writer's own expression. They are conventional, traditional, derived. Some of them represent the mythology and folk-lore of many peoples and times. Some of them are suggested by political and physical events of the writer's own time. They belong to the apocalyptic type. It is the task of the student to examine them in detail, to discover, if he can, by

¹ A book in the form of a modern novel, published in 1908, entitled *Lord of the World*, written by a Roman Catholic, the late Mgr. R. H. Benson, is an instructive example of a modern apocalypse. In this imaginary picture is worked out the great issue, as Mgr. Benson conceives it, between the individualism of Christian religion on the one hand and the communism of secularism on the other. The result is first the purification of the Church through persecution, then the triumph of the forces of this world by virtue of their superior physical power — a gloomy view which might seem to contradict faith in a ruling God. But this is only the preliminary stage, the "woes" of the end of the present age. The consummation arrives, as in the old apocalypses, by the direct intervention of God, the end of this material world, and the introduction of the coming age in which, in a new world, not our own, the rule of God is complete. With rare literary skill and restraint the picture of the future is unfolded. We see again the old figure of Antichrist, but in modern dress, and have presented to us a modern development and interpretation of the whole machinery of apocalyptic thought. This striking book is a good commentary on the New Testament Apocalypse, for it shows the vitality of this type of literature and its aptness for the effective expression of a self-consistent view of the essential nature of the great underlying spiritual realities, good and bad, as they appear to a serious observer. Whatever one may think of Father Benson's doctrine, to the student of the New Testament and of the history of literature his book is of the greatest interest.

comparative study, their origin, to trace their history, and so to account for their form in this book and to learn the particular sense in which this writer has used them. Thus it becomes possible to distinguish between form and substance, between mode of expression and the emotions and aspirations and convictions out of which in ways now beautiful, now grotesque, but always powerful, the utterances of the apocalyptic seer have sprung.

This is a laborious but fascinating task, not yet completed. To not all of our questions here will the attainable knowledge of ancient thought permit an answer. Yet enough has been recovered to enable us to see how the rest must have arisen, even in cases where we cannot point to the actual source of the apocalyptic language.

The greatest source here is the Old Testament, and the first condition of understanding the Book of Revelation is to observe how much of it is the echo and repetition of Old Testament language and imagery. The writer must have known that he was reproducing and codifying and recombining Old Testament prophecies. He must have been aiming, in part, to show how under Christian principles these prophecies still held good, and how the Christian Church might with clearer vision, and in an awed sense of the nearness of the great culmination, still use this great inheritance from the Hebrew seers.

In these three ways then the Book of Revelation can be made easier than Christians have often supposed: by a simpler attitude of willingness to take it for what it appears to be, without trying to make out of it what we might wish to find there; by recognizing through comparative study of other apocalypses the conventional character of the type of literature to which it belongs; and by a study of the sources from which the detailed imagery is drawn and by which that imagery is to be explained.

Before passing on to speak of the origin and contents of the book itself a word should be said as to some of the elements, not all of which are always recognized, which give this book its greatness as a monument of the world's literature. For that it is, wholly apart from the reverence for it produced by its place in the New Testament. To a degree remarkable in view of the general sense of its unintelligibility it has entered into the living thought of men. We talk in its phrases, and in a hundred ways are subject to its influence.

The cause is in part the majesty of its imagery. Of this no illustration need be given, or can be without citing continuous sections. Whatever the underlying ideas, their expression is sublime, and may well be set on a level with the greatest that has proceeded from human pens.

Again, its greatness arises in part from its deep roots in popular modes of thought. It stands close to folk-lore, from beginning to end. This may suggest superstition and triviality. Quite the reverse. A relation to folk-lore is characteristic of nearly all great literature. Homer, the Greek dramatists, Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, Faust — the greatest literature, like the greatest music, has its roots deep in the soil, includes the combination into beautiful and powerful elaboration of those things which the simple but profound thought of the plainest of the people has struck out with the imaginative genius and freedom of intellectual childhood. Not the sublimated conceptions of the highest culture, but the broad passion of the peasant constitutes the soil for the intellectual products which survive by their greatness.

Further, the Book of Revelation is permanently great literature not only because of its noble form of expression, and because it is close to the thought of humanity on a large scale, but because of its hold on profound spiritual truths. This gave it its place in the Bible. This is what has endeared it to the Christian heart. This will perpetu-

ate its use and will lead men to read it and to be stirred by it, and increasingly as it is better explained and understood.

Let us turn then to the Book itself.

It was written, we are told by Irenaeus, who lived a hundred years later, "near the end of the reign of Domitian," who died in the year 96 of our era. The reader may remind himself that the crucifixion of our Lord took place in the year 29 or 30, the martyrdoms of the Apostles Peter and Paul not far from the year 64, and the destruction of Jerusalem in the year 70.

This statement of Irenaeus corresponds to the facts of the book and to the situation in the Church which the book seems to reflect, and is on the whole to be accepted for the final composition of the book in its present form. It was thus probably written a generation or more after the Epistles of Paul, probably somewhat later than the Gospels of Mark, Matthew, and Luke, and was perhaps nearly contemporary with the Gospel of John.

The place of writing was evidently Asia Minor. The book opens with messages for seven of the chief churches of that region, plainly coming from some one who has intimate knowledge of their inner state.

We can gain a clear idea of the situation. The churches of Asia Minor were made up, like those of the cities of Greece and of Rome, mainly of persons who had been heathen, not of Jews. But these were in great measure men and women who before becoming Christians had already been profoundly influenced by Jewish ideas and ways. They had often been attendants at the services of the local Jewish synagogue. They knew the Old Testament, and valued it. They recognized that Christianity rested on Judaism, and they liked Jewish literature and ways of thinking. At the same time they were not Jews. Their natural associations were largely with their heathen neighbors. By the time the Book of Revelation was written

the life of these churches had been going on for thirty or forty years. The first flush of Christian enthusiasm was past. Various dangers already beset the Church, and were apparent to the watchful eye. Paul's old enemies, the Jews, were still active in their hostility to the Church, which had supplanted them in their best field of progress and proselytism. From another side speculative religious teachers, within and without the Christian circle, were raising their heads. They combined attractive ideas drawn from many religions and philosophies into a new mixture, and were in a sense progenitors of the later Gnostics. As was natural to religious thinkers of a low order whose interests were primarily intellectual and not moral, who were ready to draw from heathen mythologies and cults, and who habitually turned toward the blurring moral intoxication of asceticism, these teachers were often lax in matters of morals upon which the Church leaders justly laid stress.

From the surrounding world came constant incitement to share in the pleasures and customs of a civilization founded on and impregnated with heathen worship. Idolatry and heathenish immorality were insistent. The worship of heathen divinities in one form or another, the sharing in the festivities of idolatrous sacrificial feasts, the licentiousness of daily habit — all these things were a constant danger and temptation to these Christians, who, we must remember, were, after all, but human, as we are.

The only form of religion established and imposed by the government upon all loyal citizens (except Jews) was the one which appears with great distinctness in the Book of Revelation — the worship of the Roman Emperor. This had arisen in the East, and had finally been adopted by authority as the necessary religious basis of the unity of the Empire. Temples of the Emperor were springing up in the first century. Asia Minor was a great seat of this worship. To refuse to do the acts of reverence which it

required was to present oneself in the guise of a traitor to one's sovereign, and left no recourse to the authorities but to punish. This supreme form of idolatry, peculiarly abhorrent to the Christian mind, showed itself clearly to the writer of our book as the culmination of the work of the powers of darkness. In this devilish institution the final effort of the long world-struggle of evil against God was to be discerned.

The earlier stages of persecution had already been passed when our book was written. One martyr, Antipas at Pergamum, is named. The clear-seeing eye of the writer has already recognized that the danger of direct persecution is increasing, and that it centres in the public institution of the worship of the Emperor. How far persecution had gone is hard to say; the general impression left by the book is that the writer and the readers were well used to it.

The period is one of the most important in the history of the Christian Church, and it is unfortunate that we have so little direct historical account of it preserved for us. For the greater part of our knowledge we are dependent on inferences from this book and from the other literature of the time.

Who was the writer is not known. Apocalypses were generally written in the name of some hero of the distant past, such as Enoch, Noah, Moses, Elijah, Baruch, Daniel, Ezra, who was supposed to have foreseen these things, and we can generally detect the real writer's date by noticing, as in the Book of Daniel, the point where the prophecy ceases to correspond exactly to history, and becomes real prophecy. But not so with our book. It is frankly written for the present, and the writer's name is given as John. The unsettled critical inquiries as to whether the opening verses and the name John are a later addition to the original book we cannot here consider.² The Church has gen-

² The same is true of the inquiries into the possible composite structure of the book which have much occupied critical scholars. The book as it stands is an artistically

erally, but not always, believed that this was the Apostle John, the son of Zebedee, from whom the great Fourth Gospel and the three Epistles are alleged to come. But modern critical scholars, like some ancient critics, find it hard to believe that the two authors are the same. And the problem of authorship must here be left unsolved.

The purpose of the author is not difficult to see. It is purely practical, not at all speculative or theological. He will warn and encourage his fellow-Christians — warn them against worldliness and down-heartedness, two evils near akin, and encourage them to confidence in the object of their faith, in the power of God, and in God's ultimate victory even over the great forces which are soon to assemble themselves for the last great onset. This book shall stir the reader's feeling, and fire his imagination, and so fit him to survive the great and dreadful test which lies before God's little flock.

So we pass to the contents of these visions.

The book is in the form of a letter, with opening greeting and farewell salutation. But this is only a convenient literary form, a kind of dedication to the seven Churches whose members and their needs were particularly in the writer's mind.

The letter opens with a description of a wonderful vision granted to the seer, in the island of Patmos off the coast of Asia Minor. He became possessed by the Spirit on the Lord's Day, and saw the Lord Jesus Christ, surrounded with symbols of his great attributes and authority, many of these being drawn from the Old Testament. From him at that time he received his call to be a prophet, like that of Isaiah in the temple before the seraphim. "Write, therefore, the things which thou hast seen [the description of the vision], and the things which are [the inspired comments on the actual condition of the

framed whole, and as such is the subject of the present article. The reader curious about these theories will find a guide in James Moffatt's *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament*.

seven churches which occupy chapters 2 and 3], and the things which shall come to pass hereafter" [the visions of the future which fill the remainder of the book]. (Chap. 1.)

On the details of the early chapters, containing messages to the seven churches, we cannot dwell. They are constructed with singular literary skill, largely out of materials drawn from the Old Testament, and contain a number of allusions still recognizable to local matters at Pergamum, Thyatira, and the other cities, as well as many valuable hints about the religious situation in those places. Here, as in the rest of the book, the explanation in detail is a matter for study, and is full of interest. (Chaps. 2 and 3.)

After these things, the seer having now received his special instructions for the churches of these localities, a door is opened into heaven, and the seer passes through it to be granted a vision of God on his throne — a vision of gorgeous splendor and dazzling light. Grouped about God's throne are the members of the heavenly court — the four cherubim, in shape like living creatures, and the twenty-four angelic elders, who all render worship day and night and cry aloud with doxologies of praise, and with them ten thousand times ten thousand angels presenting their homage to God the King. (Chap. 4.)

Presently the seer observes in God's right hand a book, that is, a roll, sealed with seven seals. It is the book of human destiny. Christ alone is worthy to break the seals and open the book and reveal the future. And Christ appears on the throne with God, in the form of a Lamb as if slain. Amid choruses of praise, which accompany the action through the whole work like the lyric choruses of a Greek tragedy, the Lamb takes the book and one by one breaks the seven seals. And now the visions of the future begin. (Chap. 5.)

In all the Jewish expectation of the future, great emphasis was laid on the "woes" which were to precede the

end. These doubtless represented the concentration of the powers of evil for a last onslaught on the armies of God, and also the general breaking-up of social and physical order connected with the end of the world. They were sometimes called the birth-pangs of the Messiah. The gospel apocalypse in Matthew, chapter 24, has much to say of them. In our book they occupy with most elaborate development a very large part of the action, and enable the author to find suitable place for his traditional material. The great series of foreign invasion, wars, famine, pestilence, cosmic disturbance, is spread before us in a panorama of overwhelming awfulness.

As the seals are successively broken, four horses with their riders appear — a white horse of foreign conquest, a red horse of war, a black horse of famine, a pale horse of pestilence. At the fifth seal the souls of all martyrs cry out to be avenged; at the sixth the earth quakes, the sun becomes black and the moon red, the stars fall and the heavens are removed. We seem ready for the consummation when the seventh seal shall be broken. (Chap. 6.)

But no; an interlude of two visions. From the Twelve Tribes 144,000 persons are first sealed, that they be not hurt; and then the prophet sees before the throne the countless multitude from every nation rendering homage to God and to the Lamb. Logically these interjected visions are hard to explain; esthetically and emotionally they have admirable artistic value. For a moment the tension is relieved, we breathe freely as we see the glorious reality beyond these dark events; then the clouds shut in again and the grim series is continued. The seventh seal is broken; but it does not bring the end. Instead it introduces a new series of seven — the seven blasts of great trumpets. Hail and fire mingled with blood desolate the earth; the third part of the sea is made blood; the third part of rivers becomes wormwood; the third part of the

sun and moon and stars is darkened. At the fifth trump a star falls, and from the abyss come forth demonic locusts with the stings of scorpions, under their king Apollyon the Destroyer. They are perhaps an army of centaurs. The sixth trump sounds, and a still greater barbarian invasion from the great river Euphrates is let loose. We are again ready for the seventh trump, and the end — but the end is not yet. (Chaps. 7–9.)

Instead, after a renewed impartation of knowledge to the seer through a little book which he swallows (Chap. 10), appear two forerunners of the Messiah, perhaps Moses and Elijah, as the Jewish expectation on the basis of Malachi's prophecy had foretold. (Chap. 11.) They shall meet with martyrdom at the hand of the beast from the abyss, but shall be restored to life and ascend up into heaven in a cloud. And in that hour there was an earthquake, and the tenth part of the Holy City fell.

Then the seventh angel sounded, and the whole court of heaven raised their voices in praise to God because now at length the rule of the world has passed over to the Lord and to his Christ, and the time has come for the dead to be judged, and for the prophets and saints and all the God-fearing to be rewarded. (Chaps. 10, 11.)

But again for the reader this is not yet. We are still delayed in order to have brought before us the most singular and least well explained section of the whole book. A great sign is seen in heaven. A woman clad in the sun, with the moon under her feet, gives birth to a son who is to be the Messiah and to rule the nations with a rod of iron. A great red dragon stands ready to destroy the child. But the infant is caught up to God to be preserved, the woman escapes to a place of safety, there is war in heaven, and the great red dragon, who is called the Devil and Satan, is cast down from heaven to earth, where he carries on his persecution of the woman and the rest of her seed. (Chap. 12.)

What does this mean ? Can it all refer to the future ? Was the Messiah not yet born ? Whence the imagery ? Who is the woman ?

A type of ancient myth is found in different religions in forms varying in detail. The Greeks told of the birth of Apollo from Leto, the attempt of the dragon Pytho to kill the child, and his rescue by Boreas and Poseidon. With the Egyptians it was Isis, or Hathor, the mother of Horus, who fled from the dragon Typhon and escaped to an island. The twelfth chapter of Revelation does not seem to be an allegory derived from the facts of contemporary history. It may be that a current myth has here guided the pen of the Christian apocalypticist.

But what does he mean ? Apparently he has for once turned back from his picture of the future to a revelation of the heavenly counterpart and spiritual substratum of the events of the recent past. By the aid of this mythological narrative he portrays the events in heaven which have given rise to the occurrences that he and his contemporaries have actually known on earth. The birth of the Messiah was conceived as a fact in heaven apart from but yet parallel to his earthly appearance. He is now in heaven, he will come to judge and rule; meantime to the war in heaven which followed his birth have succeeded the persecutions from the Devil which the Church has undergone. These distresses have thus not been accidental, but are a part of the necessary development of events. The Messiah is with God. The Devil has been conquered in heavenly warfare, and is at present making his last stand on the earth. The joy of the angels is justified. Men on earth may look beyond the torment of persecution to final triumph and lasting peace.

In this chapter about the woman we have thus an interpretation of the experiences of the Church in years then recent. In the next chapter (13) this account of the significance of real events is continued with reference to the

more recent past and to the present, and so, after, as it were, going back and picking up another significant thread and following it down until it joins his main thread, the writer returns to his dramatic picture of the future.

A beast now appears from the sea with the power of the Devil. He is the imperial power of Rome, which makes war on the saints. Another beast comes from the earth. He may be the Antichrist, in whom the world-power of evil was to be concentrated, and he is the servant of the beast Rome, and the latter's agent in promoting the worship of the Emperor. We are dealing here with imaginary figures; the beasts do not represent real persons; it is the relations intended which are real. The imaginary figures are indeed not wholly the puppets of the allegory; they have some dramatic vitality of their own; but the relations of spiritual forces are those which the writer saw actually manifested in his own world. (Chap. 13.)

The number of the Beast is 666. No explanation of this is quite satisfactory. The usual one is that the name which finds its numerical equivalent here is Nero Cæsar. By another reckoning the number is taken as referring to the Emperor Gaius. At any rate the atrocities of the persecution of the Christians in the reign of Nero, and the horrors of Nero's general misgovernment, seem to be reflected in these chapters.

The distress seems now to have reached its height, and the end is drawing on. Various signs are given that herald it — angels fly in mid-heaven and proclaim the destruction of the modern Babylon, visions are seen of the Lamb and of those virtuous souls who come victorious from the beast and are free in heaven to praise the works and ways of the Lord God Almighty. Again we have a series of seven — seven angels with bowls, that is, *patera*, such as were used for pouring libations at an altar. The bowls, however, contain, not new phases of the onset of evil, but

the outpourings of the wrath of God's punishment on a wicked world. The earth, the sea, the rivers, and the sun receive this wrath. It is poured on the throne of the beast, and his kingdom is darkened. A foreign invasion from the far East — a Parthian peril — breaks loose, and ends with the battle of Armageddon. (Chaps. 14-16.)

"And the seventh [angel] poured out his bowl upon the air; and there came forth a great voice out of the temple from the throne, saying, 'It is done.' . . . And Babylon the great was remembered in the sight of God, to give unto her the cup of the wine of the fierceness of his wrath." Then follows the judgment of the great harlot, the scarlet woman on her blasphemous beast. The details introduce the seven hills of Rome, and the series of Roman emperors — first down to Vespasian, and then in a modified statement down to Domitian. Through it all gleams the lurid figure of Nero, the dead, who in the popular superstition is yet alive and to return. (Chaps. 16, 17.)

The downfall of Rome with all her grandeur and luxury and crime is depicted in a kind of elegy of triumph. She is mourned by princes and merchants and seafarers who gained their living by ministering to her lust.

"And a strong angel took up a stone, as it were a great millstone, and cast it into the sea, saying, 'Thus with a mighty fall shall Babylon, the great city, be cast down, and shall be found no more at all.' And the voice of harpers and minstrels and flute-players and trumpeters shall be heard no more at all in thee; and no craftsman, of whatsoever craft, shall be found any more at all in thee; and the voice of a mill shall be heard no more at all in thee; and the light of a lamp shall shine no more at all in thee; and the voice of the bridegroom and of the bride shall be heard no more at all in thee; for thy merchants were the princes of the earth; for with thy sorcery were all the nations deceived. And in her was found the blood of prophets and of saints and of all that have been slain upon the earth." (Chap. 18.)

But a great voice of a great multitude in heaven cried, "Hallelujah; salvation and glory and power belong to our God."

With that the scene changes completely.

“And I saw the heaven opened; and behold, a white horse and him that sat thereon, called Faithful and True; and in righteousness he doth judge and make war. . . . And his name is called the Word of God.” (Chap. 19.)

The Messiah is come.

And so the hosts of evil are defeated. The dragon, which is the Devil and Satan, is chained for a thousand years. The hopes of the people of God are accomplished in this millennium, in which their due share falls to the martyrs and confessors who in the first resurrection rise and reign with Christ. At the end of the thousand years is launched the last ineffective assault of the dragon. He seeks out, in the uttermost corners of the earth, the last barbarians, Gog and Magog. They are destroyed by fire before the beloved city, and the Devil is cast for ever and ever into the lake of fire and brimstone.

Then ensues the general judgment of all the dead, who are raised from hades and receive according to their works; and there follows the end of death and of hades, for they with the wicked are thrust into the lake of fire. (Chap. 20.)

“And I saw a new heaven and a new earth . . . and the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God.” The place of eternal bliss in fellowship with God is brought to the righteous. All things are made new and shall endure for ever. History is ended, eternity begun. (Chap. 21.)

“Behold I come quickly. Blessed is he that keepeth the words of the prophecy of this book.”

This bald summary can do no proper justice to the crowded pageant of the Book of Revelation, throughout overburdened with rich embroidery of splendid detail. Three brief observations remain to be made.

First, it has, I hope, been made clear that the Book of Revelation is no useless allegory of modern or of ancient history, but is a work, indeed a masterpiece, of literary art. The natural result of modern study of this book is to lead one to enjoy and to love it, to receive from it an influence upon his mind and heart. We can see that this book of the Bible, by being — even though imperfectly — understood, is restored to its place of dignity as a worthy expression of the human spirit. This increase of the legitimate claim of the book on the reverent interest of men is the proper and usual result of serious modern criticism. For on understanding the book much of what was repellent falls into its fit place, and is no longer a disturbing element.

Secondly, this book, with its visions of the future, its strange imagery, and its lofty poetry, brings us into direct contact with a generation of real Christians — their ideals and emotions, their dangers and aspirations, their love and worship, their hatred and abhorrence. We see here the reflection of their sufferings, and learn at what a price our comfortable privileges have been bought. We are stirred by their power to see the eternal and invisible, and our own faith should be made stronger by this contact with theirs.

Thirdly, not only literary and historical, but religious value belongs to this book. The great truths of apocalyptic and eschatological thought are permanent, and no church can be powerful which does not hold them with firmness and vitality. For they are the truths that right and wrong are eternally hostile, that God's cause is the cause of righteousness, and that His triumph is sure.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MYSTICISM AND
THE DIVINE IMMANENCE

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Recent studies in religious mysticism from the standpoint of psychology have netted, *inter alia*, the following contributions: (1) The conceptualization of divine reality, apprehended through the peculiar spiritual experience of the mystic, is based, not upon some aboriginal idea of deity, but upon the humanization of some sacred aspect of nature. (2) Mystical intuition is not a unique form of experience, but simply a way of experiencing which involves *more* of consciousness than is ordinarily exercised in plain matter of fact attention to the familiar object of the world. (3) The objectivity of God aroused as a postulate in the mind under the pressure of an intensified interest in, or concentration upon, the causal meaning of holy aspirations, is but the projection of the idealized self before the retina of the actual self as though it were a disparate entity independent of any necessary connection with consciousness. (4) The ideational aspects of the mystical *superself*, to which is attributed extraneous being, are such as denote social rather than individual qualities of life. And further (5), this subjective creation appears more intensely real (vital) or dynamic in its manifestations than the normal self, owing of course to the heightened form of the feelings and emotions out of which it is generated. In fine, the nature of the "unchartered reality," which makes itself *felt* in the excess of spiritual ecstasy, appears to overlap or transcend the natural bounds

which limit human nature and to elicit potentialities of perfection.¹

These conclusions bear upon the traditional claim of the mystic to experience God directly, and seemingly tend to a negation of the whole position. Certainly then they must be reckoned with, not simply in defense of the objective reality of God, but for the sake of clarifying our concepts of divine being. And it is especially important to examine this psychological ruling because the chief result of these scientific findings is to relegate to a sphere of second-rate interest the truth about the objective reality which underlies religious experience as a whole, and to emphasize exclusively the subjective reaction or interaction as the all-important factor in religion. The problem of what God is becomes accordingly negligible so far as the value and power of spiritual life is concerned. Indeed, a recent writer goes so far as to say, "Surely, in a study of religion, we need not be concerned with the objective reality behind the conceptual constructs of the religious consciousness."²

It is not the mystic only who may be said to protest against a dogmatic prohibition of this kind, but hosts of rationalistic thinkers are determined to bring the primary object of religious faith within the connotation of intelligent definition.³ Still, the psychological inquiry is entitled to a hearing and, in fact, should be recognized by both sides as making a contribution without which any substantial advance in theology would be permanently blocked. Let us ask then, what is the truth that has been uncovered? The answer may be put thus: the psychology of mysticism has not shown conclusively that there is an illusion in the mystic's apprehension of the "absolute

¹ Cf. John M. Mecklin, *The Revival of the Ontological Argument*. JPPsSM, Vol. XIV, No. 5, pp. 124-135.

² A. A. Goldenweiser, *Religion and Society: A Critique of Emile Durkheim's Theory of the Origin and Nature of Religion*. JPPsSM, Vol. XIV, No. 5, p. 117.

³ Cf. Durant Drake, *Seekers after God*, HTR, Vol. XII, No. 1, pp. 67-83.

other," but it has demonstrated the improbability of any direct knowledge of, or acquaintance with, a God *transcendent*. This is the primary contribution: there is no transcendent deity with whom communication is established in ways peculiar to mysticism. If it is insisted that there *may* be a transcendent God, nevertheless mysticism can not establish a guarantee. But though one may waive the suggestion of any transcendent reality in mystical experience, it is a *non sequitur* to infer that the mystic is under a delusion in regard to his at-one-ness with God; for, as a matter of course, this is exactly what the psychological analysis indicates, namely, that the personal object of religious experience is decidedly God *immanent*. In this paper I hope to make such a view tolerable to the psychologist.

My thesis may be stated negatively as follows: the sacred object of mystical contemplation is not *merely* the idealization of self-potentialities. *Potentia* connotes possibilities and powers, but not in unlimited degree; they function in proportion to a scale of existing actualities. For instance, the potentiality of the acorn is measured by the oak *and no more*; but the spiritual idealization postulated in mystical conceptualization involves *more* than can be measured by the self. It embodies a fullness of being which is immeasurable (infinite); or, to put it another way, this idealization connotes an expansive idea, the "fringes" of which transcend the possibilities of human experience. This "vision of God," which is perceived by means of the elasticity of consciousness and is wrongly identified exclusively with the self *and no other*, is not only an exhibition of superhuman potency but of human impotency as well. It is a manifestation of illimitable power, which, traced back to more elemental form, implies a spring of energies altogether out of proportion with the capacities of human nature. Since a search for fundamental reality is equivalent to the hunting down of the

elemental, it becomes simply a matter of logical economy to determine the most primary real whence all subsequent properties are derived. The ideational content of the God-idea then naturally presupposes energies which underlie their incomplete expression in consciousness. The truth of the matter is that the psychology of mysticism being dynamic, we are bound to trace the mystic's intellectual sensitiveness causally, and note that the God-concept is the effect of forces which certainly can not be measured in terms of the self alone. The conclusion would be that the idealized projection of the self witnesses to the drive, the push, the ardor or élan of the divine immanence. Why distort and corrupt elemental being, manifested in consciousness by that peculiar expansion of the self which is the experience of the mystic in acute forms and the common experience of the layman in less poignant or more blunted forms, by identifying the finite self with its infinite *superpotentiality*?

Now the primary interest of religion is in origination, in contradistinction from the science of morality, which is based upon the *terrain* of "ends" or results, beneficial or detrimental to life. To be more specific, it is the interest in the *cause* of spiritual aspiration which determines the peculiar bent of the religious consciousness. Religious reflection, as is most conspicuously revealed in piety, is not the prophetic or forward vision; it is a contemplation of primary rather than ultimate (attractive) causation.⁴ It may be admitted though that so far as religion is taken to include morality it of course embraces the prophetic outlook as well. Still, the distinctive truth-seeing of the religious consciousness is bound to be immanent rather than transcendent (or teleological). The confusion involved in the notion of a transcendent deity is the failure to recognize the fact that the God-transcendent is unreal in the present; he is simply the God in the future, who

⁴ As a matter of fact *final* causation is anomalous in scientific investigation.

becomes, or rather is, immanent when experienced. Therefore we need feel no dismay because mysticism does not apprehend God transcendent, since it is impossible to reach *ahead of existence*. While time endures, all present anticipations of God are rightly attributed to God transcending existence, but wrongly attributed to a God who transcends now; which means, in other words, that the transcendent deity is the God of subsequent manifestation merely. The actual experience of the divine being must necessarily be confined to all that which is connoted by divine immanence. We are indebted then to the psychology of mysticism for pointing out the fact that immanence and transcendence are not correlative but progressive and continuous terms.

Let us consider in this light some of the aspects of mysticism which modern psychology accentuates, particularly those which have been mentioned in the beginning of this discussion. The denial of the aboriginal God-idea and the substitution of a humanized aspect of nature transfigured by the religious thrill, is not less than an admission of immanent potentiality superior to that of human personality. For it is patent that an immanent deity could only become an object of consciousness within the compass of consciousness itself, so that the "transfiguring" or "humanizing" of nature in itself need give rise to no denial of deity. The point is, why humanize and transfigure the natural perception? The answer is, because consciousness is struggling with an object of experience which forces or compels recognition in spite of the limitations of consciousness. It is not consciousness which idealizes or overmagnifies nature in terms of itself; it is the superabundance of energy within it which projects the self out into mystical idealization. Nothing shows more clearly the dynamic process which constitutes the nature of spirit.⁵ Thus the religious thrill reveals the

⁵ See my article, *The Nature of Spirit*, BW, Vol. LIII, No. 2, pp. 145-148.

weakness or subjection of consciousness in the control of superior energies.

Again the recognition of religious intuition as a whole experience rather than singular neural reactions or interactions does not make the God-postulate self-limited in reality, *i. e.*, elementally, since intuition at best is but partial and successive effects of a spiritual causality which is by no manner of means limited to the potentialities of the actual self. Not that consciousness is the subjective effect of *Dinge an sich* outside; there is no subjective frontier over which reality passes under a contraband form. It is true that the form of the God-concept will naturally be circumscribed by consciousness, but it does not follow that consciousness is a measure of the divine, since the conceptualizations are but passing effects of energies (spirit) whose origin is indeterminate and whose extension and scope are immeasurable. The spirit is like the wind, whose passing is *felt* but the whence and whither are indeterminate.

The generalized or social character of the mystical concept is in keeping with the tendency of spirit to expand and overpass the boundaries of individual selves, but the socialized self is not coterminous with immanent deity. It is, rather, another manifestation of spirit in the inevitable overflowing of personal life. Thus the individual who is constrained spiritually to idealize himself socially does so through a superior power.

Finally, the emotional accompaniment of the mystical concept testifies again to the dynamic character of the divine immanence as the all-pervasive creative elemental force, neutral in the non-conscious universe but qualified by spiritual significance in human nature. It is said that the excessive excitement and the enhanced emotion of religious ecstasy in its most pronounced forms is a stirring or stimulation of one's spirit within and a letting it go after some manner of *laisser-aller* spontaneity. This

sounds true enough; but what is interesting about it is the spiritual momentum itself, the involuntary tendency to increase when once started. Surely the spiritual life is not self-propelled ⁶ ("By grace are ye saved . . . not of yourselves; it is the gift of God . . . lest any man should boast."). This is the essence of the mystery. And why then is it not interpreted correctly by the mystic who concludes that the soul is in the hand of *God*?

The gist of the foregoing argument may be restated thus: the "idealized self" is not *selbstverständlich*; it is an "other-than-rational" product, in which the mysteries of origin, cause, infinity, elemental reality, and the like are involved, notions which are not attributable to the creation of consciousness, since they can not be said to be experienced,⁷ *i.e.*, immediately. Why then hesitate to conclude that these *differentiæ* between the self and the *alter* constitute evidence of autogenetic personality whose only admissible meaning is God?

In closing this paper, one word more. The religious philosopher is under obligation to the psychologist for taking mysticism as an experience out of the realm of metaphor and symbolism and placing it in the domain of natural science. Not that sufficient progress has yet been made to satisfy true devotion; since, left to the tender mercies of natural science, the equation of the God-idea with an over-idealized self leaves wanting the nice point that mysticism has sought to emphasize, namely, the reality of God manifest through human conception; but when we translate divine transcendence (anticipated divinity) into terms of immanence, which should be done to counteract an immature analysis of elemental reality, as seen in

⁶ Now moral life is self-controlled. But morality and spirituality are distinguishable. Aristotle puts the whole matter in a nut-shell thus: life is determined to be indeterminate; which means, in this connection, that spiritual propulsion is deterministic and moral compulsion is indeterministic, or free. That is to say, religion constrains us to make moral decisions.

⁷ Hocking (The Meaning of God in Human Experience) notwithstanding.

the logical impatience of mystical imagination, the light of a new day will begin to break through the obscurities — not to mention the aridities and vacuities of mystical metaphysics — which have so long darkened the horizon of religious knowledge.

THE NATURE AND VALIDITY OF CONSCIENCE AND MORAL PRINCIPLE ¹

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With the guns of Flanders and Picardy shaking our deepest being, it has been almost impossible for us during the last two years to think at all. Thinking demands the calm hour and the dispassionate frame of mind, and no one of us has had many such hours or many such mental dispositions for some time past. But it is our duty as moral leaders in our respective communities to think as steadily and dispassionately as we can, so that our leadership shall be, not that of hysteria and emotion, but of a discriminating and inwardly controlled moral intelligence. To that end I invite your attention in this Berry Street Conference — so long devoted to serious discussion of vital topics — to a subject that seems to me of great, if not supreme, importance at the present time, namely, *The Nature and Validity of Conscience and Moral Principle*.

My thought has been turned to this subject by the presence in our midst of "the conscientious objector." Towards such persons we Unitarians, because of our traditions and principles, ought to be sympathetic beyond most religious bodies. Many of us in the name of conscience have left the churches and religious associations in which we were reared, given up fair prospects of ecclesiastical preferment, and joined ourselves to a small and unpopular religious fellowship. The heroes of conscience have furnished us the most important examples of the virtuous life as we have tried to interpret it to our congregations. The

¹ An address to the Berry Street Conference, Boston, May, 1918.

word "conscience," in our use of it, has always had associated with it a wealth of tender and exalted feeling. To say of a man that he was a man of conscience was regarded by us as almost the highest judgment we could pronounce upon him. To be true to conscience was thought to be the highest goal of our own moral ambition.

But the great war has come and complicated the inner life of the spirit. Some of us are moved by our consciences to offer ourselves, our sons, and our possessions to what we consider a holy crusade against the military brutality, the political aggressiveness, and the spiritual pride of an autocratic European government. We feel that to fail to come to the help of Belgium, France, Serbia, Armenia, and Russia in this time of woeful need would be to forfeit our manhood and to abandon the stricken people of the world to an endless slavery. If we do not entirely misread our own minds, we are supporting the government not because of the recrudescence of the fighting instinct in us, or because we have abandoned our hope and yearning for universal human brotherhood, but, on the contrary, because we believe that all that we, as Liberals, hold dear would be endangered by the triumph of the arms and the spirit of Germany. If our sons and the boys of our congregations who have gone to the front, should fall in this war, their memories will always be green in our hearts and homes and churches, and we shall think of them as young heroes who died to preserve to the world the liberties without which our lives thus far would have been impossible.

On the other hand, there are those who in the name of conscience take the very opposite stand. They see nothing noble in the war. For them a man's morality is compromised when he takes a gun in his hand or encourages others to do so. They can discover no glory but only tragedy in America's part in the war. Their citizenship has become to them something to be ashamed rather than proud of, they feel themselves isolated from the majority

of their former friends, and they are pained by that isolation, but conscience assures them that their position is morally sound and they maintain it in the face of opposition and entreaty. Each group appeals to the authority of conscience, and conscience leads them to opposite conclusions. All that is most holy and commanding and authoritative in one good man's heart urges, nay, drives him, into the war, and all that is most holy, commanding, and authoritative in another good man's heart forbids him to enter it.

In such a situation many old questions concerning conscience inevitably arise. What is conscience? Is its authority over the individual absolute and ultimate? Must it be respected by us even when it commands individuals to do things of which we deeply disapprove? Probably very little that is fresh can be said on these questions, but at least we are forced to ask them anew, and the old answers may have more meaning because of the very urgency of our need for them.

Few Unitarians can reflect on conscience without recalling the beautiful story from the child life of Theodore Parker:

"When a little boy in petticoats in my fourth year, one fine day in spring my father led me by the hand to a distant part of the farm, but soon sent me home alone. On the way I had to pass a little 'pond-hole,' then spreading its waters wide. A rhodora in full bloom, a rare flower in my neighbourhood which grew only in that locality, attracted my attention and drew me to the place. I saw a little spotted tortoise sunning himself in the shallow water at the root of the flaming shrub. I lifted the stick I had in my hand to strike the harmless reptile; for though I had never killed any creature, yet I had seen other boys out of sport destroy birds, squirrels, and the like, and I felt a disposition to follow their wicked example. But all at once something checked my little arm, and a voice within me said, clear and loud, 'It is wrong!' I held back my uplifted stick in wonder at the new emotion, the consciousness of an involuntary but inward check upon my actions, till the tortoise and the rhodora both vanished from my sight. I hastened home and told the tale to my

mother, and asked what it was that told me it was wrong. She wiped a tear from her eye with her apron, and taking me in her arms said, 'Some men call it conscience, but I prefer to call it the voice of God in the soul of man. If you listen and obey it, then it will speak clearer and clearer, and always guide you right; but if you turn a deaf ear or disobey, then it will fade out little by little, and leave you all in the dark and without a guide. Your life depends on heeding this little voice.' "

Now what does this beautiful and appealing little bit of autobiography suggest as to the nature and origin of conscience? Undoubtedly it suggests the theory of Bishop Butler and others, that conscience is an innate, underived, unanalyzable, inexplicable, and universal power of moral discrimination, a special magisterial faculty, which has absolute and unquestioned authority over the individual. This faculty passes judgment on man and his actions, declaring, without the possibility of error or the possibility of appeal, that some actions are in themselves right, just, and good, and that others are in themselves evil, wrong, and unjust.

But in spite of the appeal which Intuitionism makes to the active moral nature, it can no longer be accepted as a satisfactory account of the nature, origin, and authority of conscience. It would be incorrect to say that the idea of faculties of the mind has been entirely abandoned in psychology, for so great a psychologist as William McDougall still manages to make a restricted use of it. But the old-fashioned way of describing the mind as consisting of a bundle of faculties, such as perception, imagination, conception, judgment, reason, will, etc., has lost all value for our present thought. If "faculty" be taken as meaning only a psychical capacity for an ultimate, irreducible, or unanalyzable mode of being conscious of objects, the mind truly has faculties. Knowing, feeling, and striving are such faculties, for they cannot be explained as a conjunction of more fundamental capacities. More-

over, each of these groups of mental dispositions may in turn be said to include a number of faculties. Striving seems to be of two ultimate kinds, namely, striving towards and striving away from an object or appetite and aversion. Feeling, again, seems to be of two ultimate kinds, namely, agreeable and disagreeable feeling. We may even recognize a variety of modes of knowing; for example, being aware of objects, affirming or denying objects, and comparing objects.

When I object to the Intuitionalist view of conscience, then, as something ultimate and unanalyzable, I am not objecting to these words in themselves as having no meaning in psychology. I believe not only that the structure of the mind is ultimate and unanalyzable but the mind itself as well. I have no sympathy for the mode of thought which reduces intelligence to instinct, and instinct to compound reflex action, and reflex action to the irritability of protoplasm, and the irritability of protoplasm to tension in its different parts due to the incidence of impinging physical forces or to the chemical affinities of one element for another. So to explain the mind is to explain it away — never a satisfactory mode of procedure. Nor do I say that in our metaphysical thinking we may not legitimately conceive of something more ultimate than individual minds; but I feel that in all our thinking on the concrete problems of human life, it is inadvisable for us to begin with anything more ultimate than the mind itself. For us at least that mind and its structure are ultimate and irreducible.

But it is one thing to admit that there are ultimate and irreducible faculties, and another thing to show that conscience is such a faculty. History makes it perfectly plain that conscience does not command the same acts or reprimand equally for the same misdeeds. Conscience forbids the Hindu to eat meat, but the Christian conscience is silent in this regard. The content of the Roman Catholic conscience differs profoundly in many matters from the

content of the Protestant conscience. One type of conscience lies back of political and social conservatism, and another type lies back of political and social radicalism. Conscience may command in the same individual different kinds of conduct at different periods of life.

Moreover, conscience, as we all experience it, is by no means the infallible guide which it is sometimes said to be. Life is full of new and complicated situations which it does not help us to meet. It certainly does not reveal to us on all occasions with subjective certainty or objective infallibility what duty demands. It may be adequate for the solution of the more common problems of life, such as the community has long been dealing with, but the more novel and delicate situations of experience demand an insight and a wisdom which conscience cannot give. Just as habit cannot take the place of selective and creative consciousness, so conscience cannot take the place of analytic reflection and fresh moral insight.

Remembering then the obvious differences in the contents of conscience as it manifests itself in different groups and its obvious defects from the point of view of infallibility, it becomes impossible for us to use uncritically the definition of Parker's mother, "Conscience is the voice of God in the soul of man"; or the similar notion of Butler that conscience is a sort of inner oracle, imposing its decrees by divine right on the human will; or the general intuitionist belief that it is a special faculty, of which nothing more can be said than that it is and that it must be obeyed. Hence we are driven back to ask over again what it is and how it came to be.

If conscience is not a special faculty, what is it? When we recall that conscience and consciousness have the same derivation, we find the clue of which we are in search. If consciousness be defined as the sense we have of ourselves as realized in knowledge, then conscience may be defined as the sense we have of ourselves as realized in conduct.

Conscience is nothing more and nothing less than a man's whole personality when he engages in moral action or makes a moral judgment. Conscience is the self making moral judgments, or the self realizing itself in and adjusting itself to human relations. As such it includes all the fundamental capacities or activities or faculties of the mind. It contains a cognitive element, for it estimates the rightness or wrongness of actions in accordance with some standard or ideal intellectually conceived and formulated. But it also contains an element of feeling, for all moral judgments and adjustments are accompanied by emotions of greater or less intensity. Remorse, for example, which is possible only to a person of conscience, is one of the most violent, as the sense of satisfaction which follows right action is one of the most pleasing of human emotions. And, finally, it contains an element of volition; for conscience inhibits us from doing many things which impulse suggests and it urges us on to duty when the spontaneous impulse towards it flags. The self of man is many-sided. It has economic, social, aesthetic, cognitive, moral, and religious interests; but these are all aspects and functionings of one self. Of course the self sometimes seems and is divided against itself. One group of impulses conflicts with another group. Even one duty comes into conflict with another duty. But above all these conflicting impulses and motives, there is, in every normal person, what we call a real self, a master self which, given time enough, will control and dominate all the lower selves. This real or master or higher self is none other than conscience — the self as regulative of conduct, pronouncing cognitively on the rightness or wrongness of acts, experiencing certain moral emotions as its ends are realized or not, and checking impulse or reinforcing it as the particular occasion may demand.

When conscience is thus defined as the self making moral judgments, it is soon evident that our second ques-

tion, How did conscience come to be? is practically unanswerable. No one has ever succeeded in telling the story of the genesis of the individual self. When did the self come into being? At the hour of conception, or of birth, or at the moment when the child towards the end of his third year first uses the pronoun *I*, or when? No one can answer. No more can anyone say how children of the same parents, born in the same home and reared in the same environment, have different selves. Origins are mostly hidden from us, and certainly the origin of the self is.

But though the origin of the self as conscience is inexplicable, it is not difficult to see that the content of conscience is generally due to social environment. Conscience is for the most part the voice of the community speaking to and in and through the individual. Even the greatest philosopher has his main problems set for him by the life of his time. His thinking is inevitably carried on in a specific social medium. His language is an inheritance, and in using it he must submit to the shaping influence of the past. Consciousness is always individual, in the sense that it is never a mere part of a social or race consciousness and can never appropriate a community's spiritual gains without going through some of the processes by which they were achieved. Consciousness is always unique. But the objects of which it is conscious are social objects, and one person's reactions to the common social objects are inevitably of essentially the same nature as those of others. There would be no common social life at all if *blue* and *sweet* and *hard* and *round* and a thousand other common words did not mean essentially the same for all. The individual mind is not a mere piece of the race's mind; but still no individual ever escapes altogether from the idiosyncracies and limitations of his race's mentality.

So is it with conscience. It is unique in the sense that my conscience is mine and yours yours. It is for each one of

us a pressure on conduct which is exercised from within his own mind. But the content of conscience, its judgments as to right and wrong, the standards and ideals by which it judges conduct, are for the most part social or community standards and ideals. Take a cross section of the conscience of average men and women at any time or place, and we shall find that its content is more collective than individual. Certain individuals doubtless had originally more to do than others with the creation of the social standards and ideals, but, once created, the average individual judges his conduct by them without any inquiry as to their source or the legitimacy of their authority. If the collective conscience is infallible, his may be so also; but if the collective conscience is liable to error, as all history shows it to be, then his conscience is still more fallible. We should always respect conscience in the sense that we should never urge men to act against it, but we should strive to make men see that their moral judgments, like their cognitive judgments, are liable to error and that conscience is always in need of education and revision.

I have said that for the most part conscience is the voice of the community speaking in the individual. But of course that is not the whole truth. In the realm of knowledge a few individuals acquire a mastery of their mental processes and of the methods of investigation, experiment, generalization, etc., which enables them to be independent of the judgments of the average person altogether. True, science is never anything more than common sense extended and systematized and become critical of itself, but the advantage it has over common sense is so great that the scientist's system of concepts seems at first to have no relationship at all with the mere rule-of-thumb generalizing of the average man.

The same is true of the self as conscience. The individual may become independent of the conscience of his community. A more inward and, as it seems to him, a more

commanding and a higher voice may begin to speak to him, condemning acts of which his community approves and urging him to acts which his community condemns. The history of morality and religion is full of the stories of men whose consciences have been thus individualized. Amos, Isaiah, and Jeremiah among the prophets, Jesus and Paul in the New Testament, St. Francis and Luther in subsequent Christian history, Mazzini, W. Lloyd Garrison, Theodore Parker, and Henry George among social reformers, are conspicuous instances of such individualizing of conscience. They break away from the conventional morality of their community and achieve a moral elevation and independence which make them heroes for all time. So dramatic has been the awakening of the individual conscience in some cases that it has seemed more like the call of Deity to the prophetic soul than the sudden maturing of some subjective insight and impulse that has long been developing in the subconscious mind. If ever conscience can be spoken of as absolutely individual, that is, as without any social mediation or as the voice of God in the soul of man, or as perfect and infallible, surely it is in cases such as these.

But is the highly individualized conscience necessarily arrived at without any social mediation? Is the individual's community necessarily confined to those he knows in the flesh? May he not live in a world peopled by the saints and heroes and prophets of the histories, poems, stories, and sacred scriptures he has read? It would be impossible, of course, to demonstrate this in every specific case, for few moral and spiritual biographies are known to us in their entirety. But it is hard to doubt that it always is the case. The individual self achieves self-consciousness through the give and take of social life. And in this social interaction ideal and historical persons may be just as real as, indeed much more real than, one's flesh-and-blood acquaintances, and through spiritual contact with these per-

sonages the individual conscience may get a content very different from the content of his community conscience. We do well when we insist on the fact that the conscience of the individual may outgrow in many respects the conscience of his neighbors, but we yield too far to our craving for uniqueness when we insist that the more inward and commanding conscience is attained by turning our backs on our fellows altogether. We often speak of being alone with our conscience and our God, and there is a sense in which this is true. But whenever we are, our self has always its social implications. The self with which we pray in our closets is a self made up of sentiments, affections, regrets, aspirations, and hopes of which we have become possessed through our interaction with other human beings, just as the system of concepts by means of which we think in our quietest and most solitary hours in our libraries is the product of our intellectual commerce with many other minds both living and dead. I am just as eager as any one to defend the uniqueness of the individual mind and conscience. But I am persuaded that we compromise rather than protect that uniqueness when we think of it as abstract and achieved without social mediation. There is, I grant, no social mind of which the individual is only a detached fragment, like a chip from a statue. Every individual mind is unique. But there is no individual mind that has not been conceived and developed within the matrix of the social mind. No more is there an individual conscience that has developed outside of all relationship with the moral life of humanity. The genius in the intellectual world does hit out thoughts and hypotheses which no one ever uttered just in that way before, but they are always the culmination of mental processes which have been going on in many other minds as well as his own. He only anticipates the vision of others, and when he announces his vision it is caught up by an ever-increasing school of disciples, that is, persons whose

thoughts were already moving in the same direction. Likewise, the genius in the moral world achieves ethical insight and conviction which no one before had ever achieved, but, like Jesus, he always nourishes his moral nature on the insights of preceding prophets, and his own unique ethical contribution is a flowering of those insights in his personality and his teaching.

And if there is no individual conscience that has not been attained by way of social mediation, so no individual conscience is infallible in its own right. The dogmatist in the intellectual world is the man who continues to believe in his own cognitive judgments even when they fail year after year to receive the approval of his intellectual peers. Of course he may be right, and in that case he is not a dogmatist; but human minds are built pretty much on the same ground-plan, and if any individual fails to convince his open-minded peers, it is much saner for him not to be too sure of his judgment but to study the whole problem afresh and try to feel the force of others' criticisms.

Nor is it essentially different with conscience. If a highly individualized conscience can only grow up within and by means of the moral life of humanity, the highest test of its worth must be, not alone the degree of its subjective certainty, but also its power to persuade and convince those other souls whose movement of purpose and aspiration, like his own, is ever upward. There may be fanaticism in the moral as there is dogmatism in the intellectual world, and they derive from the same psychical source. Failing to see that both conscience and thought are socially mediated, people refuse to test them by social standards. Especially is this the case in regard to conscience. The individual conscience seems to them so holy that it carries authority for them in its own right. But the holiness of conscience is not due to its occupying any unique place among our so-called faculties. As a faculty conscience is no more holy than cognition, but since it

deals with conduct, the most important part of life, it acquires an aspect of holiness which cognition seldom if ever acquires. If knowledge seemed to us of supreme importance, cognition would become our holiest faculty; but knowledge has always been thought to be secondary to good will and right conduct and holy aspiration, and therefore cognition seems and for all practical purposes is less divine than conscience.

I am well aware that what I am saying, unless carefully stated and carefully followed, may seem calculated to undermine the authority of the individual conscience and to cut away the ground from individuality altogether. But that at least is not my intention. I care not how far one may carry the thought of differentiation among human individuals — indeed the further it is carried the better I am pleased — provided it is always acknowledged that it is the differentiation of a continuum. The idea of the continuity of the individual with humanity must be conserved unless we are going to abandon ourselves to a pluralism that would make even the thought of society impossible. The individual as a highly differentiated member of society I can most heartily believe in, but the individual as a human atom, as the possessor of so-called natural rights, as endowed with a conscience which makes it possible for him to pronounce infallibly on questions of right and wrong without interaction with the social mind, I can neither understand nor believe in. The pluralist would shatter society into a multitude of independent human atoms; the absolutist would merge all individuals in the whole, and treat them as mere temporary modes of the eternal, as the waves are mere temporary conformations of the water of the sea; but the more critical thinker will seek to preserve both values. He will think of differentiation and continuity not as opposites but correlatives. He will see that the individual has rights only as a member of society; that his cognitive judgments can be

considered valid only in so far as they succeed, given time enough, in carrying conviction to his intellectual peers; and that his conscience gets whatever infallibility it has from the fact that he has absorbed into himself and carried to a completer fulfillment the moral impulses and insights which he, as a member of society, has inherited from the past and appropriated from the living present.

And what is true of conscience is equally true of what we call moral principle. This word too has romantic associations in our thought. Fidelity to principle is regarded by all of us as one of our supreme human virtues. We are never done extolling it over against expediency or the tendency to compromise. And when we realize what a moral principle is, we see why we prize fidelity to it so highly. For a moral principle is a persistent deliverance of the conscience of the best people of society. It is a generalized expression of the moral experience of whole generations of men and women, and no part of our inheritance is more precious than the complex of sentiments, reverences, loyalties, and affections which we call the moral life of the past.

But here again we must be on our guard. Principles must not be treated in an abstract fashion. A moral principle is always someone's interpretation of personal and social welfare, and it gets its sacredness from the character of the purpose at which it aims. But no individual's interpretation of welfare and no generation's interpretation of welfare can be strictly regarded as infallible. Indeed, we may go further and say that the entire race's past interpretation of welfare may be inadequate to our present and future needs. The human race is always undergoing new experiences, and never more so than in the present; whole nations are now being subjected to griefs and perplexities and the bitterest necessities, which no preceding generation could possibly have predicted; the relations between the old social classes are being and will continue

to be revolutionized. And if moral principles are good men's interpretations of human welfare, is it inconceivable that the insight of the past may not be entirely adequate to the demands of the present and the future? Moral principles are a precious part of our inheritance, but they are, not so much coins to be preserved just as they are when we receive them, as seeds to be planted in the soil of our own time. The system of concepts in the scientific and philosophical world which we inherit from the past is indispensable to our intellectual life. To repudiate that system would be to find ourselves once again in the flux and chaos of the primitive man's unorganized sensations. But that inherited system of concepts is not an arbitrary group of abstract words. It is the living body of our thought, and as such must be forever sloughing off dead tissue and renewing its life by fresh experiences and fresh interpretations of old experience. "Die to live" is the principle which prevails in all living thought-systems.

So must it be in moral systems as well. Principles are not fixed and rigid guideposts to conduct. They are general summaries of experience; and as experience is always growing and changing, principles must be at least as flexible as the movement of the moral life itself. Fidelity to principle is not a fanatical loyalty to the letter of ethical commands, such as is involved in the common sayings about "hewing to the line, let the chips fall where they may," or "do justice, though the heavens fall." Rather fidelity to principle is faithfulness to those movements that one believes to be making for human welfare. Moral life is a living process in the souls of men, and that process must answer to the changing environment in which each generation finds itself. It may at any moment in its history be fairly well gathered up and expressed in maxims and precepts and proverbs and principles; but we become moral, not as we faithfully conform to these principles, but as we feel in our souls and realize in our lives the social

sentiments and loyalties and affections which constitute the living process of morality.

It is perfectly possible that some may conclude that what I have said means essentially a throwing open of the doors to compromise and expediency. It may be thought that as primitive man needed what Bagehot called "a rigid crust of custom," so men today need fixed and inflexible moral principles to guide them in this period of moral and political chaos. I agree that such fixed principles may be of great advantage at a certain period in our moral development; but for us that period is surely past. We are today confronted by a new world situation; social adjustments vaster than we had ever predicted must be made in the course of the next few years; the moral life must be expanded as it never has been before to include in its sweep all nations of men. And as we face this fateful future, we must all be anxious about our equipment for duty and opportunity. To say that we must abandon conscience and moral principle would be irrational, for that would be tantamount to saying that the past has nothing to teach us concerning the future. But I do say that we must abandon our abstract view of conscience and moral principle and our tendency to treat them as stereotyped solutions of all our moral problems. Our supreme guides must be, not a lot of ready-made principles and intuitions, but good will, the desire to coöperate, willingness to do whatever the social welfare demands, insight into the mighty forces for good and evil that the war has let loose, sanity in discriminating between the possible and the impossible, and a will to believe and a will to persevere that nothing can daunt or overwhelm.

We are undoubtedly moving towards a future big with destiny. Let us go out to meet it, not with a few abstract ethical formulas about justice and democracy and equality and natural rights, but with a living mind, a mind in vital interaction with the minds of other men and women,

a mind open to the teaching of the events amid which we live, a mind that is willing to be tentative and experimental because it knows, as Professor John Dewey says, that there is no such thing as complete moral maturity, and that all persons are still more or less children in process of learning moral distinctions; in a word a mind that follows the movement of life itself, never changing in its purpose of getting forward, but ever feeling after new ways and means of reaching the goal.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE SELF AND NATURE. DEWITT H. PARKER. Harvard University Press. 1917. Pp. x, 316. \$2.00.

Professor Parker invites his readers to embark with him on an "intellectual adventure"; and as one who has ventured I gladly bear witness that it is well worth while to accompany him. There is something singularly attractive about the intellectual honesty with which he attacks his problems. Bold yet self-critical, sure of his vision yet not dogmatic, he writes at all times with that inimitable freshness which comes only from first-hand reflection. His claims to originality, so far from being immodest, are amply justified. His theories are never mere patterns ingeniously constructed out of chips from the workshops of others. Much as he has learned from the great thinkers to whom he acknowledges his obligations — from James and Royce and Santayana, from Russell and Bradley, from Peirce and Bergson — yet he has preserved his independence of thought, and the views which he puts forward are always his own, and often both novel and important.

Metaphysics is for him the attempt to construct a total vision of the world from that fragment of it which each of us has in his own experience. "Radical empiricism extended through the imagination," is his method. A frankly "animistic conception of nature" is his conclusion. Nature for him is a single experience or mind, of the tissue of which "sensations" form a real part. To maintain within this context the distinct individuality of human minds, and thus to achieve a fresh solution of the old problem of pluralism and monism, is, I think, his chief concern. I could wish, though, that he had expounded his theory of nature on its merits in a chapter by itself. At present the reader has to piece it together from scattered passages. His attention is never focused on the theory as a whole. It is too much dispersed among particular problems.

The first of these particular problems concerns the nature of "self" and "mind" (Ch. I). Like Descartes, Parker invites us to begin with ourselves. Inspection of experience (which is for him synonymous with consciousness or mind) reveals that self is only a "part" of mind — that part which as "activities" can be distinguished from "content." Content is whatever the self "finds" or "is in contact with," in short, what is immediately experienced, what is present, as distinct from what is represented by ideas. The *unity* of the mind

consists precisely in this contact of self and content, just as the unity of the self consists in the felt "interweaving of activities."

On this basis Parker proceeds (Ch. II) to offer a theory of personal identity. As this is one of the theories for which he explicitly claims originality, it deserves to be stated and examined at some length. Its point is to defend the truth of the judgment in which each of us declares his present self to be identical with his past self. The *concept* of self-identity must be based on the *fact*, that is, on the *experience* of identity. Identity must be "given." It must be "found in experience." Moreover, it must not be analyzed away into *similarity* of present and past. Nothing but *numerical* identity will do. Now if experiences, as the usual view has it, are momentary events which never recur, it is impossible for anyone ever to have the same experience twice. He can have only another experience very similar to the first. But this yields *two* experiences, not "one and the same." On these terms therefore personal identity cannot be saved. Hence we must hold that the very same experiences can recur, that "the very stuff of the old is born again." So far all is plain sailing.

But now the difficulties begin. Identity, we are told, is a matter of "more or less." It is never without difference, hence always "partial." This invites us to single out the parts which are identical, and more, which are identical absolutely and numerically. What are they in the self? To this question Parker returns varying answers. Sometimes he refers to examples like "the experience of carrying out a plan," where there is *one* plan worked out step by step through a long sequence of experiences. But mainly, I think, he falls back on the "feeling" of identity: "There is a sense of familiarity which pervades all experience and is the abiding identity within it." He clearly means that the feeling of familiarity which I have now is one and the same at all times; the feeling of identity is an identical feeling. But there is yet a third streak, where the life of the mind is described as "self-making and self-mending"; where identity is said to be at a maximum in the concentrations of one's whole being on a serious effort, and at a minimum in light moments of self-forgetfulness. We shall readily agree that in this sense a man is now more, now less, himself, that is, at his best; but our standard here is the positive spiritual quality of the experiences involved. The discussion at this level is beyond the mere sense of familiarity, and equally beyond the problem of what is numerically identical in my present and my past. Parker's failure to differentiate these three levels at which the problem of personal identity may be discussed, seems to me to be the great weakness of this chapter. What he requires is the concept of the "concrete universal,"

which both secures numerical identity and within it leaves room for all the fluctuations of qualitative identity.

Chapter III, on "The Metaphysics of Perception," defends the thesis that "appearances" or "sensations" are "real" and constitute the very substance of natural objects. "Nature is full of warmth and cold, pressures and touches and colors unperceived by man . . . [it] sings for itself and for us too in the sound of the brook, and paints pictures for itself and for us in every landscape that we see" — a doctrine of which Parker claims that it "should recommend itself not only to the reason but to the emotions." But no mere scraps of quotation can reproduce the union of acute reasoning and poetical feeling with which this chapter is written. Chapter IV applies this theory to the "Relation between Mind and Body." The body, as a physical thing, is a tissue of sensations; but it is also the instrument through which the self expresses itself, and on which its perception of and intercourse with the rest of nature depend. Hence without the body the soul cannot exist. The death of the one is the death of the other.

Lack of space compels me to pass with a bare mention the chapters on Time, Causality, Space, Universals, and even the long and brilliant chapter on Relations, with its masterly discussion of the theories of Bradley, Royce, and Russell, and the author's own original conclusion. I turn to Chapter X, on "The Unity of Minds." Here Parker boldly applies the concept of the mind of nature to the support of the two theses that "all minds overlap with nature and through nature with one another," and that "minds die." "Even as the mind springs from nature, so it dissipates back into nature again." "The death of the mind is the result of a conflict between the body and powers of the environment which find the activities of the organism incompatible with their own." Yet if the theory accounts for death, it accounts also, so Parker claims, for the origin of life, the origin of mind, and the freedom of rational action. At the same time, there runs through all nature a streak of chance, of the non-rational, which only on repetition becomes law and habit. The influence of Charles Peirce's "tychism" is here evident.

The conclusion (Ch. XI) has manifestly been written with deep feeling. It has an effect of sombre and restrained eloquence. It gives Parker's answer to the age-old questions of human hope and destiny — immortality, progress, the birth of the superman, cosmic perfection. It argues that philosophy cannot prove immortality, nor establish a theodicy — an inclusive perfection in which evil is overcome. Yet it concludes that despite suffering and mortality this is

neither a cruel nor an aimless world. We are permitted a real, if mortal, happiness, and our deaths are necessary in order that other and perhaps superior beings may realize their destiny. Meanwhile, the fundamental values of life remain intact. True, we can no longer believe in the "protected" world of the Theism of our forefathers. Yet this is no cause for pessimism, but rather a challenge to courage and adventure. "He surely has small hold upon the good who, despite sorrow and disappointment, does not find life worth while, just in thinking and loving, in laughing and creating, be it only for a brief period, followed by a sleep where no evil memories mock."

I shall have failed completely in this review if every reader of it does not become a reader of Professor Parker's book.

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THE RELIGION OF ISRAEL. GEORGE A. BARTON, Ph.D., LL.D. The Macmillan Co. 1918. Pp. x, 289. \$2.00.

This book is the second to appear in the much-needed Religious Science and Literature Series, which is designed to meet the wants of colleges and universities. Its value is therefore not to be judged primarily by its possible contributions to original research in the subject treated, but is rather to be determined by its pedagogical adequacy. The accuracy of the scholarship in such a series ought to be assumed as a matter of course. But is the disposition of the material of the kind to convey to the student a knowledge of the intricate questions involved without confusing him, and at the same time is the general treatment of the subject calculated to awaken curiosity and stimulate interest? These are the prime requisites, I take it, for the success of the proposed volumes.

Dr. Barton, to whom the immensely important but correspondingly difficult subject of the Religion of Israel has been intrusted, is one of the most accomplished and productive of our American Orientalists and Semitic scholars. The debt of recognition for an unfailing stream of stimulating contributions to biblical science and oriental research is one of those debts of honor which his colleagues are most happy to discharge. In the present volume Dr. Barton will sustain his reputation for the thoroughness of his scholarship and the mastery of his field. From the remotest pre-Israelitic antiquity to the Logos speculations of Philo and the New Testament he has traced with care the various stages of development of Hebrew thought, which he rightly

claims is "one of the most fascinating and important phases of human history." The first chapter is devoted to the Semitic background, out of which the Hebrew religion sprang like a root out of a dry ground without much form or comeliness in it. The second and third chapters consider the value of the early biblical narratives and the origin of the Israelitic nation, with special reference to its tribal relations and to the problems connected with the conquest of Canaan. Then follow six chapters in which the religion of Israel is traced from the covenant with Moses to its culmination in the legalism of the centuries immediately preceding Christ. Budde's Kenite theory of the origin of Israel's religion is tentatively adopted, and the foundation of its ethical development is seen in the covenant idea. The last seven chapters may be regarded as little monographs on special phases of Israel's religious thought, for which no sufficient room was found within the general framework of the book. The topics covered are Priesthood and Ritual, Angels and Demons, the Religion of the Psalmists, and of the Sages, Five Religious Tracts (*Ruth*, *Jonah*, *Esther*, *Judith*, and *Tobit*), the Hopes of the Apocalyptists, and the Jewish Dispersion, with special reference to the *Wisdom of Solomon* and Philo.

Those who are familiar with Dr. Barton's work will understand at once that there are very few questions which have occupied the minds of scholars that are not at least adverted to in the pages of this book. But the question may fairly be raised whether the wealth of detail has not been at times allowed to blur somewhat that sharpness of outline which is so necessary in a book written for the instruction of college and even university men. Unhappily the experience of the reviewer does not permit him to hope that anything in the way of a general literary knowledge of the Bible, to say nothing of a scientific knowledge of it, on the part of the average undergraduate, can be presupposed. Statements therefore whose significance would be at once intelligible to the scholar or advanced graduate worker may often be quite unmeaning to the ordinary student. Dr. Barton, it is true, realizes this in certain important connections. For example, he prepares the way for the complicated discussion of the conquest of Canaan by a preliminary chapter on the method of treating the patriarchal narratives and early genealogies. Yet should there not be in any book designed for colleges and universities a preliminary chapter on an even more fundamental subject? I refer to the fact of revision in the Bible. To the student unaccustomed to the analysis of ancient sources the operations of modern scholarship often appear at first sight to be quite arbitrary. If an introductory chapter could be given

to illustrate the fact of revision in the Bible, beginning possibly with such a telling example as the two forms of the Decalogue, or with some of the many striking examples to be drawn from a comparison of Kings and Chronicles, the student would be prepared to follow the reasoning and accept the conclusions of modern scholarship in a much more comprehending and acquiescent frame of mind. I think it is also highly desirable to devote a brief chapter to a summary of the main results of the critical analysis. The incidental allusions to these outstanding results, *e.g.*, at page 20, seem hardly adequate. Of course the suggested readings at the end of chapter II on the analysis of Genesis are intended to supply the needs of the student in this respect. Yet the modern view of the development of Israel's religion is so indissolubly intertwined with the literary analysis of the material that a short chapter on this subject seems desirable from the pedagogical point of view. Granted that such a chapter might involve a few repetitions later on, this difficulty would be more than counterbalanced by the gain in the orderly approach to the main theme. Dr. Barton's very admirable discussion of the general Semitic background would follow very easily upon the two suggested chapters. The views advanced in the book are on the whole those of the moderate school of criticism, and this is well. A book designed for college use should not be made the vehicle for speculative reconstructions which have not as yet been subjected to the test of searching criticism.

In conclusion may I be permitted to refer to a few details that call for comment. The importance of the historical background for the understanding of Mosaism is rightly insisted upon and considerable space is given to this subject. But there is no corresponding background furnished for the comprehension of eighth-century prophecy, a subject which Dr. Barton is particularly well qualified to treat. The religious problem which Amos, Hosea, Micah, and Isaiah set themselves to solve was occasioned as much by the advance of Assyria as it was by the internal conditions of the sister kingdoms.

The prevailing views of Hosea's marriage, so brilliantly expounded by Robertson Smith, are adopted. They give an undoubtedly rich spiritual meaning to the account of Hosea's marriage; but they involve a highly imaginative interpretation of chapter III, and do they do real justice to chapter II? Dr. Barton strangely ignores what to the present reviewer is the chief contribution of Isaiah to Old Testament religion, namely, his spiritualized conception of the doctrine of the Remnant. On the other hand, the Messianic element properly so called, in Is. 9 2-6 and 11 1 ff., is considered to be original and is singled out for special emphasis. Possibly the time has not yet come

to discard this view in college text-books, though I am more and more convinced of its improbability. But the statement that Isaiah chose Tiglathpileser IV as the pattern of his ideal prince (p. 105) cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged. On the other hand, it is a pleasure to note that Dr. Barton comes out unequivocally for the collective theory of the Servant in Deutero-Isaiah. A campaign should be undertaken against what the reviewer believes to be the utterly mistaken course which the interpretation of the Servant Songs has taken in recent years, due largely to the weight of Duhm's authority. The individualism of Jeremiah and Ezekiel is of course referred to; but ought not Ezekiel's formulation of the doctrine to be elaborated and criticized more fully than is done on page 125? Ezekiel's one-sided theory of individualism complicated so greatly the current dogma of rewards and punishments, and this complication of the doctrine stands in such intimate connection with the development of the doctrine of the future life, that it seems as if more attention should have been paid to these thought-sequences. I wonder also if more space might not have been advantageously given to the exceedingly interesting and instructive Messianic movement after the Exile, represented by the work of Haggai and Zechariah. The failure of this movement, hinted at on page 133, paved the way for the domination of legalism, and in part at least may account for the waning of prophecy in the subsequent period, to which Dr. Barton alludes but which he does not discuss (cf. pp. 139, 146, 156). Should there not be a more outspoken condemnation of the imprecatory element in the Psalms than is found on pages 201 and 213? The resort in our day to these blotches upon the higher religion of Israel in order to clothe present hatreds with scriptural authority is a sad commentary upon our professions of belief in a developing revelation, and the unjustifiable character of these fierce outbursts from the Christian point of view needs determined emphasis. The chapter on Angels and Demons gives a most useful summary of studies in literature not readily accessible to the average college student and should start the necessary questionings in his mind when he comes to the same subject in the New Testament. In the discussion of Philo's relationship to the New Testament, ought not reference be made to the Epistle to the Hebrews as well as to St. Paul and St. John?

The queries that have been raised in the foregoing are suggested with all diffidence. I do not wish to play the part of an upstart Elihu to a Nestor in Semitic studies (if this Alexandrian blend of biblical and classical lore may be pardoned).

KEMPER FULLERTON.

MANAISM: A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION. IVY G. CAMPBELL.
(*American Journal of Psychology*, January, 1918). Pp. 49.

Students of either the psychology or the history of religion should not overlook Professor I. G. Campbell's study of manaism. By manaism Dr. Campbell means the preanimistic theory "that man first explains things, not in analogy to his own soul, as animism holds, but rather by postulating a great force" (p. 2). This force is known as mana, Wakanda, or orenda. The author bases her analysis of manaism on a painstaking examination of field workers' reports. The following quotation indicates the extent of Dr. Campbell's sources: "Not only the beliefs of primitive people quoted by the holders of this theory [manaism] but also comparable ones from other parts of the world have been considered. . . . In presenting the compilation of material gathered from reports of primitive peoples, selection has been made of that gathered from parts of the world which have not previously found a large place in the literature of preanimistic discussions. Since the data from North America and Australia have been previously extensively cited, this study, in order to uphold its contentions, stresses the data of Africa and Australasia, exclusive of Australia" (p. 2).

From her study of this material Dr. Campbell reaches the significant conclusion that primitive people do not, as a matter of fact, regard mana as impersonal. The conventional view that mana means impersonal force is attributed by Dr. Campbell to a confusion of three uses of the word "impersonal." The term, she truly says, "has been used in one of three ways, as equivalent to (1) mechanical, (2) non-bodily, (3) super-individual" (p. 17). She admits that mana is impersonal in the second and third of these senses — that it does not belong to one concrete individual human body and that it is a super-individual or collective power. But she contends that mana may be both incorporeal and over-individual without being impersonal or mechanical in the first, the literal sense of the term. The conception of mana as literally impersonal, though held by Leuba, Schmidt, and others (p. 17) is, in Miss Campbell's opinion, flatly opposed to the testimony of "nearly all the field-workers," for they "report mana as spiritual." She herself conceives of mana as personal power experienced by man "when he is acting with his group" (p. 35³) — a power which he may "eject" into a higher being, and even into a God (p. 42² *et al*). In the following comparison with Durkheim's theory she accentuates the significant features of her own: "Both," she says, "make the contrast of the social and the individual self the basis on which religion is built up; but whereas he makes everything connected

with the social sacred and hence religious, we would include within a religious complex only those objects which are regarded as capable of giving help. . . . Moreover we differ from Durkheim in regarding the power which makes the object capable of being a religious object a personal and not an impersonal one. Our theory agrees with animism in holding that the soul is the important thing in religion, but it is the soul or self that is experienced as very efficient that is anthropomorphised to become a god " (p. 40³).

It is evident that manaism thus conceived is no longer sharply opposed to animism, the belief that the soul is " the principle by which all things " are to be " explained." And the hotly debated question of the relative priority of manaism and animism thus becomes, as Miss Campbell says, " irrelevant "; for mana cannot be prior to the soul when it is part of the soul (p. 22⁴). " We cannot," she says, " find any culture where the concept of mana is present " in which " there is not also a belief in spirits in the sense of ghosts or dream-doubles. Either concept," the writer adds, " may assume the leading rôle (p. 25³). . . . Manaism as well as animism results from the tendency of the human mind to interpret things in terms of its own inner experience."

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A HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. WILLISTON WALKER. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1918. Pp. xiii, 624. \$3.00.

Students have long felt the need of a manual covering the whole field of Church History to serve as a guide to more detailed study of the best and most recent literature of the subject, and as a text-book accompanying the lectures of the classroom. Professor Williston Walker has at last given us such a work in a form attractive both to the professional student and the general reader. It is remarkably complete and well proportioned, presenting the most recent developments in the life of the Church and exhibiting the full internal growth of organization, worship, and doctrine as well as the outer fortunes of the historic institution. The obvious demands on such a book, apart from the purpose of stimulating interest in the subject, are that it should furnish the data in a precise and accurate form, that the data should be constructed in terms of the historical development established by modern investigation, and that the account should be written in the impartial spirit of scientific intelligence. Professor Walker's book meets these demands admirably. All the essential facts are pro-

vided and the footnotes and a judicious bibliography enable the reader to coördinate the use of the book with the consultation of sources. The construction illustrates the present state of historical science. There is no distorting bias of speculative theory, eccentric view, or theological partisanship. There is surely no Protestant school in which it can fail to become the standard text-book. The only general criticism that might be offered is that the story is not more related to economic and social conditions; but doubtless the time is not ripe for a presentation of this type justified by generally accepted views. Historians are advancing our comprehension of the life of institutions by references to these factors, but the safe, discriminating, and accepted formulation is not yet achieved.

Since so satisfactory a guide to study is not likely to be supplanted at any early date by a competitor, it is to be hoped that the German practice may be followed, so that by revision in detail it may evolve into a perfected form. Some trifles ask for amendment. "Asclepiodotus" is misprinted as "Asclepiodorus." The incident in the life of St. Francis (p. 257) was not "on a pilgrimage to Rome," and (p. 258) the date 1216 should be 1209. Duns Scotus' advocacy of the Immaculate Conception is overstated. In the bibliography Heimbucher's *Orden und Kongregationen* should be mentioned in its later edition, and the reader should be told of books so indispensable as Nielsen's *History of the Papacy in the Nineteenth Century*, and MacCaffrey's *History of the Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century*. Apart from such small matters, the mode of statement can often be improved by substituting for a relatively insignificant general remark one that by special definiteness implies something as to historic process. For example, the information (p. 349) that Melanchthon's *Loci* was enlarged and modified in later editions is in that form unimportant. The important thing is that while the first edition eliminated and disparaged the ecumenical dogma and limited attention to the experience of ethical redemption, later editions restored the metaphysical elements of Catholic dogma. This intimates a transition from the *Glauben* of the early Luther to the *Glauben* of creedal assent in later developments. Our generation is specially interested in the psychology of religious experience and can detect many disparities that once were concealed by identity of verbal expression. Luther's "faith" (well characterized on p. 346) was not the intellectualist "faith" of Calvin. A little sharpening of phrase can suggest distinctions like these that often mean the differentiation of groups and traditions. This line of criticism leads to a regret that Jonathan Edwards' departure from traditional Calvinism has not been indicated.

The issues of Old Light and New Light, of Conversion or Christian nurture, spring from Edwards' effort to differentiate the experience of grace from the activity of human faculties. By the omission Edwards loses significance in the record of important historic change.

To justify the suggestion of such amendments in detail mention may be made also of a little obscuration of a difference in the Christology of Origen from later orthodoxy. Chalcedonian orthodoxy affirmed two natures in one person. For Origen Jesus was one person and the Logos another person. There was still something of the older Adoptionism in Origen's view. There is the more justification for mentioning the detail since Dr. Walker commends the Chalcedonian formula as meaning a revelation of God "in terms of a genuinely human life." If that was the real meaning, Apollinaris had been misled as to the intention of the God-Man conception, and the formula would not have gravitated to the result of meaning an impersonal humanity becoming personal in the personality of the Logos. Dr. Walker's remark, however, applies admirably to the Christology of Origen. Here again is a criticism that is not querulous. Something hinges on it, and Dr. Walker as an admirer of the work of Loofs will see that what is meant is that the physical redemption theory was not a presupposition of Origen's thought.

The book thus happily furnished to general reader and theological student is learned, luminous, and complete, the work of one who has mastered a complicated subject.

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MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL.

JESUS AND THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. FRANCIS A. HENRY. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1916. Pp. iv, 444.

This book stands high in the ranks of the *Vermittlungstheologie* — that long line from the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Alexandrians through Aquinas and the Schoolmen down to the exponents of the modern New Theology, who have endeavored to build a bridge between the religion of the past and their own day. It maintains that the life of Jesus as set forth by the Synoptists furnishes the true and the only true Gospel — the exhibition of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of men. This was early corrupted by mistaken views of Jesus' Messiahship, by the rabbinic theology of Paul, and by the paganism of the Catholic Church. The author's message is therefore essentially, though not verbally, "Back to Jesus." In uttering this he, like others who have proclaimed this message, does perhaps scant

justice to the inherent need to religion of theology. Probably most students of Christian history would assign greater legitimacy to the connection between Jesus and the later intellectual developments of Christianity. Without such development, and with the accounts of the Synoptists alone when examined in the light of biblical study, it is doubtful whether we should have an adequate basis for Christianity. "Back to Jesus" implies that we shall find there a foundation broad enough to build a world on. Yet if we did not have the Pauline and Johannine amplifications, even with all their misunderstandings, the life of the ages would have had fewer Christian answers to its questions, fewer questions which it cared to ask.

The book, however, is full of deep and sound thinking, and its tone is admirable—judicial without sternness, conciliatory without pliancy, courteous, serious, holding its lofty aim of discipleship constantly in view. And its style is correspondingly direct, close-knit, clear; revealing large margins of learning yet not displaying them. It presents the reader with an ease which has been bought by the labor of the writer. There are many illuminating insights and felicities of expression. Those who have been repelled from what they see labeled as Christianity may find here a reverent and thoughtful guide to an acceptable apprehension of Jesus' message.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

GREEK GOSPEL TEXTS IN AMERICA. EDGAR J. GOODSPEED. (Historical and Linguistic Studies in Literature Related to the New Testament. First Series; Texts. Vol. II). The University of Chicago Press. 1918. Pp. x, 186. \$1.50.

THE GOSPEL MANUSCRIPTS OF THE GENERAL THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY. CHARLES CARROLL EDMUNDS and WILLIAM HENRY PAINE HATCH. (Harvard Theological Studies. IV). Harvard University Press. 1918. Pp. 68.

THE WASHINGTON MANUSCRIPT OF THE EPISTLES OF PAUL. HENRY A. SANDERS. (The New Testament Manuscripts in the Freer Collection. Part II). The Macmillan Company. 1918. Pp. x, 65. \$1.25.

Professor Goodspeed's volume gathers together six collations of Greek Gospel manuscripts now in American or Canadian collections, with brief introductory studies and one or two good plates of representative pages from each codex. Such careful work is valuable, for manuscripts may be destroyed by fire, and in any case American libraries and private collections are not easily accessible to European scholars. The studies were published separately, beginning in 1902;

the two latest, which complete the volume, treat of the Haskell Gospels, belonging to the University of Chicago, and of a Gospel manuscript in the library of Harvard University. Apart from the Freer Gospels, the several codices represent various late types and do not offer much of special interest in the character of their text. Almost any manuscript, however, may sometime prove to have its own significance for textual history. When its contribution is added to a great mass of other evidence, in the hands of a master, that which by itself was wholly uninteresting may become full of instruction.

A work similar to Professor Goodspeed's is that of Professors Edmunds and Hatch, who treat of three Gospel manuscripts — two of the 10th century, the other written in the 10th or early 11th and with its text surrounded by a commentary. Each is fully collated, and is described in a suitable introduction, supplemented by excellent plates. The three show varying examples of "Syrian" text; the catena manuscript is closely similar to Codex Γ, which is of the same period. These two volumes thus contain collations of nine manuscripts. At least six others are known to exist in this country, and it should be someone's business to publish equally careful collations of those.

Professor Sanders in publishing his collation, with illustrations, of the manuscript of the Epistles of Paul in the Freer collection brings to a close the publication of Mr. Freer's four Biblical manuscripts. In this last of the four, out of a hopeless blackened lump of decayed parchment infinite patience has recovered some part of all the Epistles of Paul except Romans. It is all that is left of a superb copy of the Acts and Epistles written in Egypt in the sixth century. The text, as would be expected, is of the "Alexandrian" type, and is especially closely akin to α A 17. It seems to be wholly free from "Western" readings. If the manuscript were complete, it would rank with the chief ancient uncials; and this publication of it makes a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the history of the Alexandrian text.

JAMES HARDY ROPES.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE MYTHOLOGY OF ALL RACES. (Louis Herbert Gray, Editor; George Foote Moore, Consulting Editor.) Vol. XII, Egyptian: W. MAX MÜLLER, Ph.D.; Indo-Chinese: Sir J. G. SCOTT, K.C.I.E. Marshall Jones Co. 1918. Pp. xiv, 540.

The two mythologies treated in the present volume are not only widely separated geographically; the sources of our knowledge of all phases of the religions of Egypt and of Indo-China are so radically

different as to necessitate in each instance a special method of approach. The study of Egyptian mythology depends on ancient texts and on ancient monumental evidence. To the interpretation of the former the student should bring a critical philological knowledge of a high order; properly to weigh the significance of the latter he ought to have had wide experience as an archæologist. Nor is it, in these days, too much to ask that he who ventures into this most difficult branch of Egyptology should have an intimate acquaintance with the results and methods of the social anthropologist. Thus equipped, a writer can to some extent cope with the formalism of the ancient texts, and can hope partially to reconstruct from the material remains some of the popular phases of Egyptian religious belief. To strike a balance between these two bodies of evidence — often divergent and at times in direct opposition — is only possible to one familiar with the laws governing primitive social expression.

Dr. Müller, it will thus be seen, has attempted no mean task in undertaking to present his readers with an account of Egyptian mythology; Sir James Scott has been confronted with one hardly less difficult in attempting an exposition of the mythology of Indo-China. In this area, despite the shadowy possibilities of its having been once entirely dominated by a single race — whether Talaing or Khmêr — almost as great a diversity now prevails in the field of mythology as in those of race and language. The literary sources, whether they deal with Burma, Cambodia, Siam, or Annam, are of no very great age; nor has a systematic study, on comparative lines, of the rich monumental sources of this important region been as yet advanced to a point where the mythologist, writing for a general audience, can derive much trustworthy information from them.

It follows that the mythology of Indo-China — being, as Sir James Scott has himself observed (p. 257), “a mixture of hero-worship and distorted history . . . with the worship of intangible natural forces” — is of a very heterogeneous character. The local divinities of the Egyptian nomes at least display, broadly speaking, so strong a tendency to conform to a few common types, and the later processes of syncretism, however complex, are so much alike when viewed in perspective, that it is in the majority of cases possible to appreciate the outstanding features of the local and of the national religions. Although the present writer is of the opinion that two religions, originally the expression of two different peoples, are to be distinguished in the ancient Nile Valley, the problems arising from their contact and partial amalgamation are hardly more difficult than those afforded by the beliefs of Indo-China. The latter region is one of great ethnic and

linguistic diversity. The nominal Buddhism of the majority of the inhabitants has to a large extent worn down the more conspicuously individual features of the different faiths, and the more primitive features that have survived too often bear to each other resemblances which are due simply to a parallelism that is significant from the general, rather than from the particular and limited, point of view. In short, whereas the author of the first part of the present volume has had before him a task to the accomplishment of which philology, archæology, and a knowledge of social anthropology could all contribute, the writer of the second section has had to depend almost wholly on the methods of the folklorist (in the serious sense) and of the ethnologist. This limitation has been offset by Sir James Scott's intimate personal knowledge of Indo-China, a knowledge which has enabled him to base many of his deductions, especially those regarding Burma, on his own observations.

Dr. Müller has acquitted himself well of his difficult task; but his share in the volume (245 pp.) will prove disappointing to those who recall the freshness and vigor of his *Asien und Europa*, which twenty-five years ago so stimulated students of early Mediterranean history. The author, faced with the impossibility of presenting our fragmentary knowledge of Egyptian mythology without first giving his reader a general account of Egyptian religion, rightly begins with an account of the local cults. This he follows with a chapter on sun-worship, and with a third on other gods connected with nature. This serves as an introduction to the creation legends and what he properly enough terms "cosmic myths" (Why the Sun-God Withdrew from the Earth, The Lost Eye of the Sun-God, etc.). There follow two chapters on "the other principal gods" and on divinities of foreign origin — chapters which cannot be said to add much to the necessary setting, or anything to our knowledge, being in the nature of a catalogue which is, of course, not exhaustive, nor as detailed even as the notices in Lanzone's *Dizionario di mitologia egizia* (1881-86). The succeeding chapters treat of the "worship of animals and men," of "life after death," "ethics and cult," and "magic." A final chapter—to the reviewer the most interesting in the book — presents a general view of the development and decline of Egyptian religion as a whole. Notes containing many valuable references are appended at the end of the volume (pp. 362-428) — an arrangement which leaves something to be desired on the score of convenience, because of the awkwardness of having this material separated from the text by over a hundred pages of foreign matter. A bibliography which makes no pretense to completeness, and which contains some items which serious scholars would choose to ignore, has been furnished by the editor

(pp. 434-447). Both text and notes are illustrated (219 figures and 3 plates in the text, 10 figures in the notes). The illustrations are well chosen, but their scientific value is seriously impaired by the author's neglect in not giving the sources from which he has selected them. Even to the professed Egyptologist such an omission is bound to prove a source of annoyance, while the layman, interested in a particular illustration, may be in doubt as to whether it is a copy from an Old Kingdom tomb or a New Empire papyrus.

Dr. Müller has, however, laid himself open to graver charges than these: he has consciously ignored the vitally important question of totemism in Egypt; he does not recognize the probability, already referred to, that the history of Egyptian religion as we see it is the gradual fusion of two different faiths; and, finally, he has too often lost sight of the fact that his theme is not Egyptian religion as a whole, but the more limited one of Egyptian mythology.

With regard to the first of these weaknesses the author justly remarks that "the interpretation of totemism in general is at present in a state of discussion and uncertainty" (p. 362, n. 4). The truth of the observation is self-evident; it might also be added with fairness that there are at the present time far too many writers of the type of S. Reinach, to whom the word "totemism" is an alkahest in which all religious problems are soluble. But the prevalence of such extreme views does not justify Dr. Müller, or anyone else, in a refusal to consider if, as the evidence in the case so overpoweringly suggests, a belief in kinship with animals does not lie at the back of many of the most prominent and peculiar features in Egyptian religious belief. It is needless to urge this point against a writer who says of the nome signs that "their application was divine or local, never tribal like the totemistic symbols of primitive people" (*loc. cit.*). Anyone acquainted with primitive ethnogeography, ancient or modern, will recognize that "tribal" and "local" are almost interchangeable terms in such cases, and the Egyptologist would be especially ready to admit the validity of this equivalence in the ancient Nile Valley.

It is more excusable that Dr. Müller says nothing of the fact that Egyptian religion of the historic period exhibits so many marks of having resulted from the imposition of a conqueror's creed upon that of an indigenous conquered population, that one feels safe in predicting that no great advance in these studies will be made till they are approached from this angle. The theory here is a new one, and has not yet found full expression; but it is so clearly in the air at the moment that it is surprising that one could treat the solar religion — presumably that of the cattle-owning intruders — and the Osiris cycle (the

indigenous faith) without at least a reference to the possibility that the opposition between the two was due to underlying differences of race. Dr. Müller inclines to see in this profoundly significant conflict an implication of "previous millenniums of religious thought" (p. 213) before the beginning of the Dynastic Age; a suggestion which hardly meets the case.

That it was necessary for Dr. Müller in handling his subject to provide the lay reader with a good deal of general information of a non-mythological character has already been conceded. It cannot, however, be questioned but that we are here presented with a good deal of matter which is irrelevant to the central theme. Thus the chapter on magic (pp. 198-211), which might have been written by one quite unacquainted with the recent advances made by Hubert and Mauss, has little bearing on any aspect of Egyptian mythology, if we except the narrative-charm given on pages 210, 211. More spells of this character ought to have found a place in such a chapter. A similar charge of irrelevance might be sustained against the chapter on "Life after Death" and "Ethics and Cult," as well as against the major part of those which consist of little more than catalogues of deities.

Without going into details — and many will object to Dr. Müller's conception of animism, to his fondness for astral interpretations, and to his proneness to adduce Semitic, to the practical exclusion of other, parallels — it may fairly be said that whereas the author has given us a readable introduction to Egyptian religion, he has not justified his title. Many readers will find his work more serviceable than the uninspired handbook of Erman, or than the cursory survey of Weidemann, but it quite lacks that grasp of the subject displayed by Breasted's excellent little volume.

The difficulties which must have beset Sir James Scott in the accomplishment of his task have already been indicated. It is not invidious to say that at times the reader is aware of these, although the author has succeeded in giving a unity to his subject because of his well-defined views as to the normal course of mythopoeic tendencies all the world over. Fairy tales, as he remarks, are apt to "begin by being anonymous; then they are attached to famous names . . . and so we get the same stories among nations who [*sic*] have never had any connexion with one another, but have passed through the same intellectual processes" (p. 357). A recognition of this truth, differently expressed, is found at the beginning of his account (p. 256), and indeed pervades it.

A brief introduction is followed by a chapter on the creation myths, some of which are of exceptional interest. Without going so far as

those who maintain that, before their entry into Indo-China, the Karens had been in contact with either the Jews or the Nestorians of China, one will readily admit that the *Forbidden Fruit* story given by the author (pp. 269 sq.) has a remarkably close parallel in that of Genesis. In his third chapter, the author gives a good account of the myths and legends attaching to various popular festivals, and the reader who delights in startling contrasts between old and new will do well to read the account of the annual Rek Na festival in Siam (pp. 328 sq.). In this ceremonial ploughing the agitation of a Minister of Agriculture, the height of whose waist-cloth betokens droughts or floods, and who on the auspicious day has to perform arduous and unwonted duties of a magical character beneath the eyes of a sovereign who has passed through Harrow, Oxford, and Woolwich, are more easily imagined than described. The fourth (and last) chapter of Sir James's work, based to a great extent on a study by Sir R. C. Temple (*The Thirty-seven Nats of Burma*, London, 1906), deals with a group of Burmese demons on whose worship the Buddhism of the people may be said to rest. The spheres of action of these Nats — to be reckoned for practical purposes as thirty-four in number, though thirty-seven are tabulated in the *Mahâ Gîtâ Medani* (p. 340) — are defined with unusual precision, and to most of them are attached mythic accounts of their origin or deeds. Sir James's text, contained as it is within little more than a hundred pages, makes no pretense at being exhaustive. Some space, moreover, has been given to what are now either exploded views or commonplaces (e.g., pp. 254 sq. — the opinions of Grant Allen and of Herbert Spencer on the origin of religion). Yet the material here published has not before been gathered together between two covers; much of it, while innocent of the convenient rules of scholarly presentation, bears the marks of having come under the author's personal observation; and the plates (twenty-one in number), many of which are colored, are well chosen and adequately reproduced.

With regard, therefore, to this twelfth volume of the *Mythology of All Races*, it may be said that, despite the few objections mentioned above, the book is a valuable addition to the series in which it belongs. It stands, as such a publication ought, on a plane between that of the purely popular and that of scientific research. In such times as these, moreover, a welcome unusually cordial ought to be given a volume which, by its very nature, makes for a deeper humanism and a widening of horizons.

ORIC BATES.

EDUCATION FOR LIFE. THE STORY OF HAMPTON INSTITUTE. FRANCIS GREENWOOD PEABODY. Doubleday, Page, & Co. 1918. Pp. xxiv, 394. \$2.50.

It would be difficult to imagine two more different books than *The Education of Henry Adams* and this volume by Professor Peabody of Harvard, for many years one of the trustees of Hampton Institute. Both are biographical studies rather than treatises on education, they were published almost simultaneously, and they cover very nearly the same period of American history; but there the similarity ends. In point of view and in their effect upon the reader they are poles asunder. Henry Adams, in spite of every advantage and of certain very real accomplishments, found life to have little educative value. He was morbidly introspective and might have summed up his life in the words of "the Preacher": "What profit hath a man of all his labor? Vanity of vanities, all is vanity." His memorial is the figure of intellectual resignation to the inevitable, which St. Gaudens so marvellously fashioned for him in bronze.

General Armstrong, on the other hand, born in the far-away Pacific Island of Maui only a few weeks after Adams saw the light reflected from the dome of Boston State House into the windows on Hancock Avenue, found life rich and abundant. He flung himself with joy into its battles, learned to believe in labor as a moral force, formulated a new type of education for an untrained and servile race, and left a great institution as the monument to his spiritual insight and moral power. The secret of his career is to be found in those moving memoranda which he jotted down just before his death. "A work that requires no sacrifice does not count for much in fulfilling God's plans. But what is commonly called sacrifice is the best and happiest use of one's self and one's resources — the best investment of time and strength and means. He who makes no such sacrifice is most to be pitied. . . . Few men have had the chance that I have had. I never gave up or sacrificed anything in my life." No better testimony to the power and charm of his personality could be asked than that of his most famous pupil, Booker Washington, who wrote in *Up From Slavery* that "it has been my fortune to meet personally what are called great characters, both in Europe and America; but I do not hesitate to say that I never met any man who, in my estimation, was the equal of General Armstrong. . . . One might have removed from Hampton all the buildings, class rooms, teachers, and industries, and given the men and women there the opportunity of coming into daily contact with General Armstrong, and that alone would have been a liberal education."

Professor Peabody has written with great charm and skill the story of his great work, set against the background of the dark days of the Civil War, and brought down through the administration of his honored successor to the end of the first half-century of the Institute. It is a story for all who love the tale of a gallant knight of the spirit, for all who would understand the idealism of America shining above the sordid politics and rampant commercialism of the second half of the nineteenth century. The book, indeed, belongs quite as much to the literature of missions as of education, for Armstrong was quite right when he wrote, "If the Hampton School is anything, it is a missionary work for the spread of the truths of clean Christian living among the negroes of the South and the Indians of the West." He brought to its founding and development the impulse of his father's missionary work among the Hawaiians, and that exuberance of his own adventurous spirit which had led to his youthful answer to the question of what he intended to be — "Missionary or pirate!"

With steadily increasing success the school has shown the way to train backward races for the complex life of modern civilization, until it has become a standard type which those confronted with similar problems in other lands come to study. For the vision which Armstrong saw as he voyaged to Mobile with his colored troops at the close of the war, the vision which he lived to make real, was of an institution which should train this black race just emerging from slavery to live efficiently and happily in freedom. He realized clearly enough that mental and moral education must be accompanied by manual training, since the vast majority of the negroes, as of every race, must get their living from the soil or in the workshop. The problem was to teach a people who regarded labor as a curse to find in it a blessing and a means of spiritual and intellectual enfranchisement. In his first report as principal he outlined the need of an education "which shall be at once constructive of mental and moral worth and destructive of the vices characteristic of the slave." So he planned to make "the needle, the broom, and the wash-tub, the awl, the plane, and the plow, become the allies of the globe, the blackboard, and the textbook." His purpose was not only to prepare the negro to meet the economic competition for which he was so unfitted, but to hold up a new ideal of life before his pupils. "More and more," he wrote later in life, "I believe in *labor as a moral force*. While its pecuniary return to the student is important and the acquired skill is equivalent to working capital, the outcome of it in manly and womanly quality is, in the long run, perhaps the most valuable of all." He recognized the

difficulties in the way — the reluctance of the negroes themselves to attend a school at which manual labor was required, the problem of working out a new educational system, the high cost of industrial training; but he fought his way forward, and in a decade could write, "Salvation by hard work is an understood thing." So he went forward to the end, dying in 1893, prematurely exhausted by incessant toil, but having firmly established a great principle of education.

To an exceptional degree Hampton has held fast to the ideal originally laid down for it. Armstrong's successor, the late Dr. Frissell, always felt himself to be but carrying out the founder's plan, and stood, a modest, wise, benignant figure, behind the prestige of his predecessor, and wist not that his own face shone with light. But under his gentle guiding Hampton has become a more potent influence than ever before in the working out of the negro problem, has become a standard from which many another institution in other lands than America has drawn inspiration. For it has remained first of all a spiritual power; it has embodied to a degree equaled by hardly another institution of learning in the country, a pure type of practical Christianity, training the whole man or woman for a life of honorable and self-forgetting service.

Here then is an ennobling tale, an inspiration for the teacher and the missionary, for the lover of democracy and the student of the intricate and difficult problems of racial and social adjustment. It is the story of men and women who united a brave heart and a tender conscience with practical sagacity and far-sighted vision. Of them, as of few others, might it be said, "And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever."

HENRY WILDER FOOTE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

GOOD AND EVIL. A STUDY IN BIBLICAL THEOLOGY. LORING W. BATTEN, Ph.D., S.T.D. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1918. Pp. 224. \$1.25.

This book contains the Paddock Lectures at the General Theological Seminary in New York, where its author has been Professor of the Literature and Interpretation of the Old Testament for twenty-five years. Its object is to present the various theories of the problem of good and evil contained in the Hebrew writings. Into the New Testament approach to the problem the author does not go, save for an occasional illustration.

These are popular lectures written in a popular style, and they do not pretend to present an exhaustive treatment of the subject. They are rather a convenient summary or outline of Hebrew thought upon the problem of evil. Beginning with the early and general Hebrew assumption that God is the source of both good and evil, and that He sends evil upon men as the direct result of sin, the discussion traverses in successive chapters first the Hebrew criticism of this doctrine in the face of experience, then the modifications of it to be found in the Pentateuch, the post-exilic prophets and the other writings; again in the growing tendency to dualism and to assign to evil spirits and to Satan the origin of evil, and finally the solution of the problem in the doctrine of immortality as it appears in the Apocryphal writings. The closing pages of the book describe briefly the attitude of Jesus to the problem, and emphasize its importance in the light of the sufferings caused by the War. The book is readable, far from dull, compresses a good deal of information into brief compass, gives the Bible text in constant foot-note references, and contains fresh discussion of many Old Testament passages that are both familiar and unfamiliar to the general Bible reader. Its chief value is to provide a useful and generally accurate survey of the thought of the Old Testament upon a problem which presses heavily upon the minds of all at the present time.

The chronological development of the theme invites certain difficulties which have not been met with entire success. In the discussion of the various solutions of the problem we are led from Job back to the Pentateuch and from the books of the Maccabees to a narrative in the Kings or in the Chronicles, so that the historical sequence in the Hebrew literature itself in its thought upon these different aspects of the problem is not at all clear. It would have been in the interest of clarity if in each chapter the orderly development of the Old Testament literature could have been followed. One is not at all sure, for example, whether the author places the book of the Chronicles after the book of Job, because in the Chronicles "Satan is after higher game than the individual" and acts "quite independently of Jahveh." It is unfortunate also that, by the method of treating the subject, the author's discussion of Job is split into different sections and assigned to different chapters. And his theory that the book is a sort of collection of all the different views of the problem of evil is open to grave exegetical and historical question.

The problem of vicarious suffering as presented in the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah is only incompletely sketched, and one misses in the entire discussion an elaboration of the idea so close to the Hebrew heart and so intelligible at the present time, of the sublimation of the

sufferings of the individual in the prosperity of the people as a whole; an explanation of evil in an individual experience as a necessary and integral part of the welfare of the nation, and of the nation as an instrument to be used by God for the establishment of His kingdom on earth.

One would have been glad also if further attempt had been made to show the value of the Old Testament solutions of the problem of evil to the thought of our own time, and of the way in which, taken together and interpreted in the light of the revelation of Jesus, they bring us as near to the solution of the greatest of mysteries as the mind and soul of man can be brought.

Within the limits that have been indicated, however, the book is a welcome addition to the literature on the problem of evil, and cannot fail to stimulate the reader to a fresh study of the Old Testament as it bears upon this problem.

RAYMOND CALKINS.

CAMBRIDGE.

EVOLUTION IN CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. PERCY GARDNER, Litt.D., F.B.A. (Crown Theological Library). G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1918. Pp. xiv, 241.

For the Broad Church party of the present day, Dr. Gardner prefers the term Modernist. The term, to be sure, is unsatisfactory, especially as it has been used by the Roman Curia as "a sort of clothes-horse, on which to hang any views it regards as dangerous." Nevertheless Dr. Gardner considers it on the whole the best word to designate that party which in the English Church is the direct descendant of Maurice and Kingsley and Stanley. The writer's own position is stated as follows, in his chapter entitled "Loyalty to Truth": "It seems to me so self-evident that it only needs to be stated, that the best way for the translation or re-affirmation of the beliefs and principles which lie at the roots of the Christian faith is, not to abandon the love and even the fanaticism of veracity, but to transfer our loyalty in part from scientific to symbolic or ethical truth, to transplant the fundamental assumptions of Christianity from the field of history, the realm of outward and sensuous fact, to the higher realm of ideas. . . . And here we find the very essence of the Modernist Movement" (pp. 144, 145).

Perhaps in the above quotation the phrase "in part" should be emphasized. For Dr. Gardner does not mean to evacuate the field of history for the realm of pale abstractions. He rather wishes to see in history itself the working of those eternal ideas which are of perma-

ment and essential religious value. Thus he finds two ways of regarding Christianity—the cataclysmic and the evolutional. If the latter view meant that we were to regard history as the mere result of necessitarian forces, he would accept the cataclysmic view with all its intellectual difficulties. But he rather finds that the evolutional concept itself allows room for “essentially spiritual views of God and the world.” From this point of view he reviews the chief elements of Christian faith and the result of this attitude on the problems of loyalty to truth, to the creeds, and to the Church.

There is nothing new in this general thesis. It might rather be supposed that the evolutional or historical method had become a commonplace of modern theological thinking. Yet this is by no means universally the case, and Dr. Gardner’s scholarly and yet popular treatment will be of value. Of course different persons will differ as to his specific results, and the author carefully avoids a dogmatic attitude. As to his general method, there ought to be no question.

EDWARD S. DROWN

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLOTINUS. WILLIAM R. INGE. 2 vols. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1918. Vol. I, pp. xvi, 270; Vol. II, pp. xii, 253. \$9.00.

The Church of England has produced many scholars and a few theologians, but rarely indeed has a great philosopher emerged from the ranks of her ministry. Nor has the atmosphere been particularly favorable to his development. Archdeacon Paley brought northern common-sense, fostered by a Cambridge mathematical training, to bear on the justification of the Christian position, and George III said of him, “Paley’s a clever man, but he’ll never be a bishop, never be a bishop”; and what the Head of the Church as by law established said, most of its members felt. For philosophy, which leads men to abstruse speculation, is not congenial to the spirit of an institution so fundamentally English as the Church of England. It is as alien to the balancing tendency of the Elizabethan age as to the political conceptions of the Stuart, the rationality of the Georgian, the romantic revivalism of the Victorian, or the socialism of the twentieth century. The Anglican church, whether static, as a conservator of its historic tradition, or dynamic, as an energy trying to leaven the English world, has never been truly contemplative.

At the present moment, when the Anglican clergy are as obsequious to King Demos as ever their predecessors had been to their spoliator,

Henry VIII, or their betrayer, James II, it is refreshing to think that in the Dean of St. Paul's the church is represented by one at any rate who is a learned philosopher and neither a sycophant nor a simpleton. He possesses the rare gift of being entirely out of sympathy with every modern delusion. He despises the mixture of socialism and Anglo-Catholicism, almost as much as he detests the genuine articles; he sees little virtue and much danger in Labor, and the triumphs of modern progress make no appeal to him. Soon after his appearance in London he delivered a series of brilliant addresses to a small company of women, and declared that white labor with all its arrogance was quite unnecessary to the world, and during the war the frigidity of his patriotism drew him to sympathize with the defection of the Marquis of Lansdowne. It is not surprising therefore that the present volumes are dedicated to the author's friend, Viscount Haldane of Cloan.

But however profoundly one may disagree with Dr. Inge's views, his expression of them is to be welcomed as coming from a distinguished ecclesiastic, who is neither anxious to flatter public opinion nor afraid of it. During the war the pulpit repelled sensible people alike by its bloodthirsty denunciations of the foe, its semi-disloyal sentimentalities, and its fatuous predictions that the triumph of democracy would bring a millennium upon earth of high wages, short hours, and prohibition of all enjoyment. Nought of this is to be found in the Gifford Lectures, delivered at St. Andrew's during the war, which are characterized by patient study, clear thinking, and not a little vigorous hitting.

The Gifford Lectures of 1917-18 are a sequel to the Bampton Lectures of 1899, which produced no small sensation at Oxford. The subject was Christian Mysticism, in the study of which the lecturer became impressed with the value of Plotinus, the philosopher of the third century of our era, as one of the greatest mystical thinkers. Though a non-Christian philosopher and an opponent of the Gnostic forms of popular Christianity, Plotinus had a profound influence upon the thought of the Church, and he still lives in the pages of St. Augustine, who read him in a Latin translation. He is, however, little known even to scholars, owing to his deficiencies as a writer, his style being crabbed, careless, and involved. He was in fact a teacher and a lecturer rather than a literary artist, and his reputation has suffered in consequence. Dr. Inge's task is to impress the world with a due sense of the importance of Plotinus as a deeply religious thinker. He was certainly an attractive character, to judge from the biography written by Porphyry, his admirer and disciple.

Plotinus is supposed to have been born about A.D. 205 at Lycopolis in Egypt; but he would never speak of his home or family, and lived, says his biographer, "as one who seemed ashamed of having a body." He steadily refused to allow his portrait to be taken; but an artist contrived to sketch him while he was lecturing. The facts of his life are few. He was evidently well educated; he studied under Ammonius Saccas for ten years. He followed the army of Gordian into Mesopotamia, and after its defeat he escaped with difficulty to Antioch. The last twenty-six years of his life he spent at Rome as a teacher. His classes were apparently small and his method far from systematic. The world owes a debt to his pupils, Amelius and Porphyry, for the preservation of the substance of his teaching in the *Enneads*. Plotinus enjoyed the patronage of the philosophic but incompetent emperor Gallienus and his wife Sabrina. He almost succeeded in persuading them to permit him to found a city for philosophers in Campania, to be called Platonopolis; but the scheme was never allowed to mature. Porphyry tells that his master was much trusted by his friends and was often made a guardian of their children, discharging his obligations with scrupulous care. He died in his sixty-seventh year. His life covers one of the most disastrous periods in the history of the Roman Empire; but Plotinus seems to have been little affected by the calamities of his age, nor did current events leave much trace on his philosophy, though the delusions of his time evidently troubled a mind devoted to the pursuit of truth. He appears to have possessed a calm serenity of temperament, and not to have yielded to the superstition of an age which was singularly inclined to theurgy, magic, and stimulated ecstasy. Nevertheless, Plotinus is a mystic to the core, his desire being to prepare for communion with God, and for the realization of His perfect beauty.

Interesting as Plotinus' system is, the really important fact in Dr. Inge's book is the standpoint of the author, to whom Plotinus appeals chiefly because of his message to the world of today. Neoplatonism was, in fact, the philosophy of a society on the eve of dissolution. After the age of the Antonines, according to Dr. Inge's view, the Roman Empire entered upon an age of steady decay. The government became stupidly bureaucratic, liberty and initiative were discouraged, the industrious middle class were being crushed out of existence, and the revenues wrung from the taxpayers were devoted to the luxury of the court, the maintenance of a military establishment, and the provision of bread and stores for a degraded proletariat. Already even Christianity was becoming more of a superstition than a vital religion, under the influence of the influx of the monastic ideal. To a

mind naturally pessimistic the parallel between the last days of Rome and our own is too obvious to be missed, especially by those whose knowledge of philosophy is perhaps more profound than their acquaintance with the broad facts of history. Dr. Inge recognizes the analogy between the days of Plotinus and our own and presses it home with great force of language and felicity of expression. Perhaps the most striking passage in the book is in the "Concluding Reflections" (vol. II, p. 227):

"Neoplatonism differs from popular Christianity in that it offers us a religion, the truth of which is not contingent on any particular events whether past or future. It floats free of nearly all the 'religious difficulties' which have troubled the mind of believers since the age of science began. It is dependent on no miracles, on no unique revelation through any historical person, on no narratives about the beginnings of the world, on no prophecies of its end. No scientific nor historical discovery can refute it, and it requires no apologetic except spiritual experience. There is a Christian philosophy of which the same might be said."

The last sentence reveals the author's mind. He is not a Neoplatonist masquerading as a Christian, he is essentially Christian in his outlook. In some passages the Puritan element in his character is strongly in evidence. He does not agree with the comfortable doctrine of a "religion of the healthy-minded," nor does he disregard the testimony of saintly mystics that contrition is a salutary remedy for the soul. His contrast between Plotinus and the Christian is illuminated by the following quotation from Eucken:

"Plotinus is further removed from Christianity than these statements express, but he is also more akin to it than the collision between the two allows to appear. In both we find an uncompromising inwardness and a drawing of all life towards God, and in both rather by renunciation of the world than by coöperation with it. But Plotinus finds this inwardness in an impersonal spirituality, Christianity in a development of the personal life. In the former, all salvation comes from power of thought, in the latter from sincerity of heart. . . . In Plotinus we find an abandonment of the first world, a fading of time in the light of eternity, a repose in view of the whole; in Christianity we find an entrance of the eternal into time, a world-historical movement, a power working against the irrationality of the actual."

In view of the danger of civilization being submerged, Dr. Inge calls on men who have the deposit of truth committed to them from Hebrew, Greek, and Roman to live simply and conserve it. "What the Church did in the Dark Ages the combined forces of Christianity and humanism must do now." He admits that Plotinus and his school were defeated by the Church, but Christianity carried so much away from them that Plotinus himself would have been "half satisfied."

As one closes these volumes, whether he agrees with Dr. Inge or not, Plotinus compels admiration as a solitary figure prepared for the worst, but refusing to bow to the idols of the market place or to surrender his intellectual freedom "*arbitrio popularis aurae*."

F. J. FOAKES-JACKSON.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE PROBLEM OF SPACE IN JEWISH MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY. ISRAEL ISAAC EFROS, Ph.D. Columbia University Press, 1917. Pp. viii, 125. \$1.50.

SAADIA'S POLEMIC AGAINST HIWI AL-BALKHI. ISRAEL DAVIDSON. Published by the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. A Fragment edited from a Genizah MS., with a Facsimile. New York. 1915. Pp. 104. \$1.00.

SCROLLS. ESSAYS ON JEWISH HISTORY AND LITERATURE AND KINDRED SUBJECTS. GOTTHARD DEUTSCH. 2 vols. Bloch Publishing Co. New York. 1917.

This scholarly work by Dr. Israel Isaac Efros forms volume XI of the Columbia University Oriental Studies, edited by Professor Richard Gottheil, a fact which, taken by itself, gives it a standing in the world of letters. But even without such a background it would attract the attention of the learned, for its merits are quite apparent in many ways. The study of Jewish philosophy has in recent years received more attention on the part of English-speaking Jewish scholars than ever before. But most of them, following the pathway of German Jewish scholars, regard Jewish philosophy as a mere effort from a philosophical point of view to defend Judaism or at best as efforts to adjust it to conditions of the world. Dr. Efros finds Jewish mediæval philosophy rich in original thought on problems that have no direct bearing on the Jewish religion, and endeavors to derive from it a possible solution of "a problem that has baffled human thought ever since the days of Zeno of Elea" — that of space. He shows that the Jewish mediæval philosophers not only affirmed the independent existence of space, but some even took a geometric view of things and conceived the corporeal essence in terms of space. To them space and matter were often synonymous terms. Because Jewish philosophy is so much influenced by the theories of Plato and Aristotle, Dr. Efros gives by way of introduction an excellent though brief discussion of both the Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of space. The views of the Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages on Empirical, Absolute, and Infinite space are then carefully presented. Dr. Efros brings

forth many suggestions advanced by the Jewish thinkers in the Middle Ages, which might lead to a new and perhaps better understanding of the problem.

Students of Hebrew philosophical texts will find Dr. Efros' *Glossary of Some Hebrew Philosophical Terms in Connexion with the Subject of Space* extremely valuable, for it embodies a good deal of philosophical matter.

It is regrettable that neither the author of the work nor the editor of the series makes mention of the fact that the work, with the exception of the glossary and index, appeared previously in the pages of vols. VI and VII of the *Jewish Quarterly Review (New Series)*, 1916.

As a whole the work of Dr. Efros will have accomplished much if it will help to stimulate a larger interest in Jewish philosophical problems among students of philosophy in general.

During the summer of 1914, while on a visit to the library of Cambridge University, Professor Israel Davidson of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America examined the Genizah collection, and was "fortunate enough to light upon so important a document as the long-lost Polemic of Saadia against Hiwi Al-Balkhi," who flourished about 850-875. Despite the fact that the latter is mentioned in Saadia's *Emunoth W'Deoth*, Ibn Ezra's *Commentary on Exodus* and Ibn Daud's *Sefer Hakabalah*, his name was almost lost to Jewish history and literature. It was not until the early part of the nineteenth century that his name was again brought to light. It was first Rapoport, and after him Luzzatto, who drew the attention of Jewish scholars to the importance of Hiwi as a rationalistic critic of the Bible. Ever since then, Hiwi and his teachings became the subject of hypothesis and vague conjectures advanced by many Jewish scholars. Hiwi was a skeptic, who, because he propounded two hundred questions relating to the Bible, Jewish philosophy and theology, was attacked by the Rabbanites and Karaites alike.

It was the refutation of these two hundred questions that caused Saadia to write in Hebrew an extensive polemical work, a fragment of which Dr. Davidson has edited from a Genizah MS., accompanied by an English translation and critical notes, and published as volume V of the *Texts and Studies of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America*. It is not difficult to infer from this fragment, containing answers to at least forty-seven questions, that Saadia regarded Hiwi's work as destructive criticism of the Old Testament doctrines. That the Gaon Saadia had written a polemical work against Hiwi was known before, but only a single quotation in Barzilai's *Commentary*

on the *Sefer Yezirah* was accessible. Dr. Davidson's find restores to us a large part of that work, enabling us to clear up many doubtful points as to the nature and contents of Hiwi's questions. We may well agree with Dr. Davidson's inference from two passages in the fragment (sect. 37 and 61), "that Hiwi composed his Book of Questions in a tongue that was not Hebrew," and that he "wrote it in rhymed prose." That Saadia wrote his "polemic" in Hebrew was already suggested by S. D. Luzzatto in 1847, in connection with his publication of an extract from Barzilai's *Commentary on the Sefer Yezirah*. Dr. Davidson's discovery not only confirms this suggestion, but also shows that Saadia followed Hiwi in writing his refutations in the form of a rhymed prose poem with acrostics of the Hebrew alphabet as well as of his own name.

In his excellent introduction Dr. Davidson comes to the probable conclusion that, being inclined towards both Christianity and Zoroastrianism, Hiwi denied the authenticity of the Torah, and accordingly "endeavored to spread his views throughout the schools by means of a new principle of Biblical exegesis;" but he neither defines nor does he show the workings of this principle. Forfeited is Davidson's "additional testimony," that Hiwi was influenced by the teachings of Magi. This consists of a peculiar, indeed ingenious, explanation of the Hebrew term *מכשף* applied by Ibn Daud to Hiwi. Dr. Davidson thinks that this term "is to be taken as the rendering in Biblical Hebrew of the word *magician* in its etymological significance of a follower of the Magi, not in its derived sense of enchanter." Equally untenable is his contention that *מכשפים* in Ibn Daud's description of Hiwi stand for two cities or districts in the Orient, though he admits that he is "unable to identify them."

In editing the text Dr. Davidson displays vast erudition and critical acumen, though in a number of cases he misread the text and accordingly mistranslated a few, quite important, passages. But this in no way diminishes the value of the publication as a whole. We may heartily join the editor in the hope "that the publication of this text together with the facsimile will enable others who work in the same field to discover the rest of this remarkable document."

Jewish learning in America is placed under an obligation to Professor Deutsch by the collection of his *Scrolls*. For first, the *Scrolls* though representing a reprint of articles which have appeared in various periodicals, come in a period of dearth in Jewish scholarship, at least so far as publications are concerned; and secondly, they appear at a time when historical sanity is tremendously needed, an invigoration

of the historical sense; while in the third place, the *Scrolls* are uncommonly interesting. They comprise, besides the Introduction containing reminiscences of the author's youth, surveys of the years 5663 (A.D. 1903), 5665, 5666, 5668-5676 in Jewish history; Philosophy of Jewish History; Minima Curat Historicus; De Minimis Curat Historicus; Everybody Says So; 1815 to 1915; History Repeats Itself; Isaac M. Wise; Moses Mielziner; Jacob H. Schiff; One Generation Goeth and Another Cometh; Reminiscences of the Breslau Seminary; Leyser Lazarus; Friedenthal and the Breslau Seminary; Isaac Hirsch Weiss; Isaac Loeb Perez; Shalom Alechem; Heinrich Heine and Francis Joseph.

In these *Scrolls* Dr. Deutsch exhibits a unique quality. He has a historical imagination that never flags. He sees the scene vividly before his own mind, and presents it as vividly to his readers. He has an intense human interest, not without the salt of humor. It is the personal human side of Jewish history that seems primarily to attract his interest. In a manner of his own he describes the transition from mediævalism to modernism in Jewish history, from the Ghetto community to the Reform congregation. Because Dr. Deutsch always scrupulously insists on unimpeachable truth in history, his *Scrolls* will be found indispensable to the future historian of present-day Jewry. For he has brought together a wealth of material valuable for one who desires a knowledge of the ideas that permeated Jewish life in the period that marked the transition from strict Jewish orthodoxy with its uncompromising opposition to secular culture, to the period when the acquisition of secular ideas was no longer considered deleterious to the religious life of the Jew. Indeed, what Dr. Deutsch says of his own reminiscences is equally true of his *Scrolls*. They "serve future generations as a mirror of conditions, in many instances representing a remote past, and important because they coincide with an era of transition."

Though the *Scrolls* are frequently prolix in statement, they are written with refreshing vigor and are rich in unworn phrases. Dr. Deutsch drives his facts and theories abreast rather than tandem. For this reason the reading of the *Scrolls* calls for close application, of which the rewards are ample. It is only regrettable that present conditions did not enable the learned author to give us more of his *Scrolls*; but the excuse is perhaps to be found in the Rabbinic phrase, "The Torah was given in single scrolls" (Gittin 60a), which Dr. Deutsch so aptly placed on the front pages of his *Scrolls*.

JOSHUA BLOCH.

LAKE CHARLES, LOUISIANA.

LETTERS AND CONTRACTS FROM ERECH WRITTEN IN THE NEO-BABYLONIAN PERIOD. CLARENCE ELWOOD KEISER, Ph.D. (Babylonian Inscriptions in the Collection of James B. Nies, Vol. I). Yale University Press. 1918. Pp. 42. Plates 60.

Before the great war students of the civilization of the Ancient Orient were accustomed to look to such institutions as the British Museum, the Berlin Museum, and the Louvre for publications of cuneiform texts. Since 1914 Europe has been compelled to suspend, for the time being, many of her operations along purely literary lines. But, thanks to the foresight of such institutions as the Philadelphia Museum, Yale University, and the Harvard Semitic Museum, as well as to that of such individuals as the late J. Pierpont Morgan and the Rev. Dr. J. B. Nies, America has been enabled to step in and to count it a privilege and duty to take up the task which Europe has so well done in the past, and to sow, as she did, that herself and others may reap. The volume at present before us is a sample of the thorough and efficient way in which our scholars are assuming their obligations.

Dr. Keiser's book is the first volume in a series which proposes to publish the "Babylonian Inscriptions in the Collection of James B. Nies," and Dr. Keiser himself is one of that school of young Assyriologists which Professor Clay of Yale University has founded and is developing. American scholarship expects much of these young men, and there are signs that it will not be disappointed. This work of one of Professor Clay's students contains forty-two pages of introductory matter and sixty autographed plates. It is a pity that photographs of a few of the tablets are not included, for they would serve to give the student a better idea of the tablets under consideration than much explanation could do.

In this volume one hundred and seventy-seven texts are published. They consist of letters and contracts from Erech, the ancient Uruk, written in the Neo-Babylonian period. There are ninety-four letters, thirty-six legal documents, and forty-seven temple administrative records. The letters are legible only in part, but the contracts are well preserved. The chief value of these texts is philological, but they contain in addition much material valuable for a study of the social, commercial, and administrative institutions of the Neo-Babylonian empire. There are records of debts, taxes, rents, and mortgages; of exchange, interest, leases, sales, payments, and receipts; there are records of notes promissory and of slaves, of lists of witnesses and balances of accounts, of sheep bought for sacrifice and of taxes to be paid by women. No. 67 contains a request that wine be sent to the sun-god Shamash for sacrifices; Nos. 18, 34, 62, and 93 refer to

the common oriental custom of covenanting with salt; and No. 167 has reference to the observance of a day something like the Hebrew Sabbath.

Both the letters and contracts contain much material useful in the study of the Neo-Babylonian cult. The relation and rank of the many temple officials is a subject which will derive much light from a study of these texts. This is especially true of a class of temple servants called *širaqu*. They were marked or branded with a star (MUL), similar to that placed upon animals, and may have been dedicated to a god.

The primary object of this series being to present only the texts with indices to scholars, no translations have been made, but the indices contain valuable material. First, there is an index of personal names, with more or less full references (such references should be complete, *e.g.*, there is no reference under *Na-din* to No. 18); and then a catalogue of the letters, giving the names of the addresser and addressee; and one of the contracts, giving the date and contents.

The autographed work is splendidly done, but it is a pity that so many printer's errors were allowed to remain in the brief introductory remarks, *e.g.*, "egible" for "legible," "convenanting" for "covenanting"; and in proper names the *dingir* is often omitted when the sign appears in the plates, *e.g.*, p. 37, No. 18. This is a serious error, for students of Babylonian religion are very much concerned with the use of this title. Without the original tablets or a photographed copy it is impossible to check up the accuracy of the copying, but there are some forms which appear questionable, especially in Nos. 93 and 169. But on the whole the copying seems to have been very carefully done.

Assyriologists will look with interest for the succeeding volumes of this series.

SAMUEL A. B. MERCER.

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SHORT NOTICES

THE VITAL ISSUES OF THE WAR. RICHARD W. BOYNTON. The Beacon Press. 1918. Pp. x, 134. \$1.00.

A volume of eight sermons, endeavoring to clarify the leading moral issues of the war for busy people. The titles of some of the sermons will indicate the scope of the book: "The War and the Social Revolution," "The Influence of Sea Power in War," "America's Leadership in the World of Tomorrow," "The United States of Europe."

THE PROTESTANT. BURRIS A. JENKINS. The Century Christian Press.
Pp. 203. \$1.35.

This book, with its accent on the penult, is too flippant for usefulness, too serious for a jest-book. It aims to commend itself by shocking, to make capital out of its antics. "It copies Carlyle," says the author, "and very imperfectly at that. It apes Elbert Hubbard" (p. 7). Everything that is bad in style, loose in thinking, superficial in suggestion, destructive in criticism, is here. The Church, theology, the so-called religious press, the clergy, the whole institutional side of religion, look, after the author's handling, like a French village after occupation by the Germans. Criticism is ever needful; but it is not apt to be persuasive when it casts aside intelligence, reserve, and sanity, and indulges in hysteric gestures and "a barbaric yawp." The only excuse for the book is that the author seems sincerely desirous of better things than he thinks he finds.

A STUDY OF LATIN HYMNS. ALICE K. MACGILTON. The Gorham Press.
1918. Pp. 116. \$1.25.

An interesting essay on a subject too little known. It is crudely written, with too many superlatives (pp. 30, 49), and immature judgments (p. 52), too facile quotation of the opinions of others instead of discriminating criticism (pp. 40, 60). But its chronological method of treatment is good, and its catalogue of 490 hymns with their sources and the collections in which they may be found, is excellent. One serious defect is the absence of an index to the hymns mentioned. There is no way of discovering whether a given hymn is referred to. The proof-reading is occasionally defective.

THE REVELATION OF JOHN. CHARLES L. WHITING. The Gorham Press.
1918. Pp. 259. \$1.50.

The author states his purpose as "an attempt to reach an interpretation of the Revelation of John that will be both reasonable and in accord with the best modern scholarship, and at the same time so simple that the ordinary layman will find it easily within his grasp" (p. 5). The three-fold aims of this purpose have been fairly attained. The book is not for scholars but mediates their work to the average reader. It contains an Introduction on the date, authorship, historical setting, plan, symbolism, of the Apocalypse; a detailed Exposition; and a Translation, whose slight differences from the A. V. and R. V. seem to give little justification for its presence. The historical treatment avoids the follies of those who would make the Revelation a bundle of predictions and who endeavor to find its lesson for modern times by piecing together numbers and calculating years.

THE WAR AND THE BIBLE. H. G. ENELOW, D.D. The Macmillan Co. 1918.
Pp. 115. 60 cents.

The conduct of the Jews in America in regard to the war has been admirable. Jewish regiments have been formed and marched, and Young Men's Hebrew Associations have ministered aid, and Jewish money in millions has been contributed. That this is in line with Jewish history is set forth in this little book. The author shows by felicitous quotations from the Old Testament how the Hebrews were taught and trained to fight for their existence, and how and when war is justified by the Bible. Apart from this main aim, the book is valuable as a commentary on large portions of the Old Testament, for it gives the circumstances under which these were written, and so shows them as vital and vivid. It may be commended, on the one hand, to Sunday School teachers as a text-book on the Old Testament, and, on the other, as an indication of the religious thought of Jewish leaders today.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

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- LETTERS TO TEACHERS, AND OTHER PAPERS OF THE HOUR. *By Hartley B. Alexander.* The Open Court Publishing Co. 1919. Pp. 253. \$1.25.
- SIX THEOSOPHIC POINTS AND OTHER WRITINGS. *By Jacob Böhm.* Newly translated into English by John Rolleston Earle. Constable & Co. 1919. Pp. vii, 208. 10s. 6d.
- COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS (The Bible for Home and School Series). *By Edward J. Bosworth.* The Macmillan Co. 1919. Pp. 281. \$1.40.
- THE SCHOOL IN THE MODERN CHURCH. *By Henry Frederick Cope.* George H. Doran Co. 1919. Pp. 290. \$1.50.
- ANIMISM. *By George W. Gilmore.* Marshall Jones Co. 1919. Pp. xiv, 250. \$1.75.
- DICTIONARY OF THE APOSTOLIC CHURCH. Vol. II. Macedonia — Zion. *By James Hastings, etc.* (Eds.). Charles Scribner's Sons. 1918. Pp. xii, 724. \$6.00.
- WHY WE FAIL AS CHRISTIANS. *By Robert Hunter.* The Macmillan Co. 1919. Pp. xiii, 180. \$1.60.
- THE PROBLEM OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL. *By H. Latimer Jackson.* Cambridge University Press. 1918. Pp. xxiv, 170. 6s.
- THE WAR AND PREACHING. *By John Kelman.* Yale University Press. 1919. Pp. 216. \$1.25.
- THE CONSUMING FIRE. *By Harris E. Kirk.* The Macmillan Co. 1919. Pp. xiv, 183. \$1.50.
- ON TO CHRIST. THE GOSPEL OF THE NEW ERA. *By Edwin A. McAlpin, Jr.* George H. Doran Co. 1919. Pp. 180. \$1.25.
- THEOLOGY AS AN EMPIRICAL SCIENCE. *By Douglas Clyde Macintosh.* The Macmillan Co. 1919. Pp. xvi, 270. \$2.00.
- MIND AND CONDUCT. MORSE LECTURES DELIVERED AT THE UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY IN 1919. *By Henry Rutgers Marshall.* Charles Scribner's Sons. 1919. Pp. ix, 236. \$1.75.
- THE SPREAD OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE MODERN WORLD. *By Edward C. Moore.* The University of Chicago Press. 1919. Pp. xii, 352. \$2.00.
- HISTORY OF RELIGIONS. Vol. II. Judaism, Christianity, Mohammedanism. (International Theological Library.) *By George Foot Moore.* Charles Scribner's Sons. 1919. Pp. xv, 552. \$3.00.
- A BOOK ABOUT THE ENGLISH BIBLE. *By Josiah H. Penniman.* The Macmillan Co. 1919. Pp. xii, 444. \$2.25.

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SECOND REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER, APPOINTED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION OF 1913. The Macmillan Co. 1919. Pp. xx, 301. \$1.50.

CAN MANKIND SURVIVE? *By Morrison J. Swift.* Marshall Jones Co. 1919. Pp. 201. \$1.50.

DEMOCRATIZING THEOLOGY. A CALL TO EDUCATED RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP. *By Herbert Alden Youtz.* The Pilgrim Press. 1919. Pp. 39. \$0.25.

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